

THE FUTURE OF EAST AND WEST

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WORLD PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

• The Future of East and West


An Essay in Surmise

By

Sir Frederick Whyte, K.C.S.I.

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CHAPTER I

THE UNCHANGING EAST AWAKES

And not through Eastern windows only
When daylight comes, comes in the light . . .

A. H. CLOUGH.

THE future of East and West is one of the great problems of the twentieth century. These two are the poles on which the world revolves, and unless the axis of their movement is stable the globe itself cannot turn in orderly progress. Europe and Asia have profoundly influenced one another throughout all history ; between them they have made the world what it is to-day ; and their closer contact, in modern times, in religion, culture, art, trade, and politics, will make the world of to-morrow. The historic origin of the new relation in which they stand face to face to-day lies in the world-wide expansion of European influence since the Renaissance, which has, as it were, created a new Asia.¹ And we shall neither understand the character of this apparent change in the East,

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nor be able to guess its probable effects on the world as a whole unless we know something of the events and the forces which wrought it. The spirit in which the East and the West will approach the problems of their new relation in the twentieth century is a matter of supreme moment.

Before we proceed to take the bird's-eye view of this vast subject, a word of caution is necessary. Europe and Asia are convenient terms in which, as it were, the history and quality of two continents are personified. They summon up a picture of two beings possessing faculties and characteristics which are in sharp contrast, and they suggest that each has a fundamental unity of mind which justifies the use of one name to describe a whole continent. The very title of this little book makes the assumption that "the East" can be correctly used to describe the whole continental entity which we call Asia, that its peoples possess fundamental qualities in common which are recognisable as characteristically Asiatic and set them in a world of their own apart from "the West." And it makes the further assumption that the nations comprising "the East" also possess the fundamental unity of mind mentioned above.² This is far from the truth. The

East is, in fact, a picture of variety and diversity, not of uniformity or unity ; and as we survey its vast extent, covering the greatest land area in the world, we shall find that "Asia" is no more than a convenient geographical expression which cannot be made to cover anything resembling that continental unity of culture which the word "Europe" correctly denotes. And it should be added that, for convenience, the terms "Europe" and "the West" are used somewhat loosely in these pages to include America, because, though by no means identical, Europe and America are, in fact, one civilisation. It is therefore not only convenient but substantially correct to use one term to describe them both.

The geographical expression—"Asia"—covers many lands, many peoples, many religions, customs, and climates. The continent stretches from the Arctic Ocean to the Equator, from Smyrna to Yokohama. Within its all-embracing fold are men of every colour, and scenery of every kind. It is forty times as large as Germany, India alone stretching for two thousand miles from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, and China holding nearly one-quarter of the human race. Its immense deserts, majestic

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mountains, and unmeasured forests defy the puny foot-rule of Europe, and make even the expanse of America look small. The rivers in India and in China swell during the normal flood season to the magnitude of inland seas ; it takes nine days to traverse Northern Asia by train ; and the Dutch East Indies, if laid down in the Northern Hemisphere, would span the Atlantic Ocean.

Magnitude so imposing begets a feeling akin to awe ; but before long the traveller in Asia loses all account of size, for as he passes from the dry steppes of the centre to the great mountain masses and from the mountains to the steaming swamps, he is more impressed by the infinite variety of the panorama than even by its vast extent. Here physical and cultural contrasts are deeper and more numerous than in Europe ; and if the traveller brings with him the preconceived notion of unity, which some European writers have been too prone to suggest, he will soon relinquish it and find the chief source of the fascination of Eastern sojourn in the inexhaustible variety, diversity, and contrasts of Asia.

Asia is, indeed, a house of many mansions. Within it the three worlds of the Hindu, the Musulman, and the Mongol are more widely

sundered than any of the nations of Europe ; and in the Far East alone, the Chinese and the Japanese reveal, beneath their superficial resemblance, profound differences which place them further apart than the Latins are from the races of Northern Europe. And this is true despite the fact that much of the foundation of Japanese life was taken from China.

Considering the contrasts in the physical conditions of life and the comparative isolation, which for long separated the different regions of Asia from one another, it could hardly be otherwise. The desert breeds man in one image, the rich tropics mould his brother in another ; and the religions which have sprung from these two sources bear the impress of their origin. Hinduism is the offspring of nature in India, rich and various, terrifying and glamorous ; Islam the offspring of nature in the desert, simple, exacting, hard, and austere. If there were no other fissure in Asia than this profound cleft between Islam and Hinduism, it alone would still suffice to reveal contrast rather than conformity as one of the outstanding features of the continent.

Asia has been called inscrutable, immobile, the home of contemplation and the nursery

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of religion. The unchanging East has been held up before us as the great world-contrast to the restless enterprising West. No doubt there is historic truth in this antithesis, especially in Hindu India, which stands so strangely apart from the rest of Asia; but it does not apply to all the peoples of Asia, nor to the whole record of the relations between the two continents. In the fifth century of our era it was the East, in the person of Attila, that was "restless and enterprising"; in later times, the Arabs swept through the Mediterranean, conquering North Africa and Spain; and later still (1689) only the vigour of John Sobieski saved Vienna from the hands of the Turks. It has, indeed, been said that the Orient begins at the Landstrasse, the eastern suburb of Vienna; and it is a fact that Asia laid her mark deeply upon the whole landscape between Vienna and the Golden Horn.

Moreover, Europe learned from Asia her alphabet, her numerals, her astronomy, and her religion. The Arabs taught us how to navigate ships, and long before any European had ventured across the unknown ocean the seamen of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had found their way to Madras and Java. Nor was it only in war and seafaring

that the Mongol and the Arab had read Europe a lesson. The law-givers, artists, and craftsmen of Asia had performed achievements that reach the height of human endeavour. Only the supreme things in the European record can be said to rival the Psalms of David ; the laws of Moses, Asoka, or Confucius ; the temples of Angkor, Madura, or Borobudur ; the Taj Mahal ; or the Art of Tang and Sung in China.

Here is evidence enough to disprove the charge that Asia is the stagnant continent and to give us pause in our confident assumption of Western superiority. The East was not always lapped in slumber, nor in its historic record has it any reason to fear the challenge of the West except in modern times. And even by the test of contemporary achievement, the European and the American of 1932 has not performed his self-appointed task of civilisation with such marked success as to justify his arrogance towards Asia. Yet the fact remains that since the opening of the sea-road to the East, Europe has expanded over the world and Asia seems to have possessed no innate power capable of resisting the onset. The tide which originally brought the Asiatic to Europe has long since receded, and during the past century—

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indeed, for practically four centuries—the discovery and exploitation of the East has grown to the proportions of a great imperial movement. Since the days of Queen Elizabeth, and with an increasing momentum through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Europe has turned the tables on Asia; and the dawn of the twentieth century found the Asiatic in the grip of forces greater than any he could himself command.

Now it is easier to describe the effect of these forces in the relation of Europe and Asia during the past four centuries than to reveal their true nature or their origin. Europe is a dynamic continent; and the European has taken hold on life with both hands and has sought to wrest from it all that physical power and intelligence could make it yield. Hence his widespread and manifold activity, his marvellous exploitation of the forces of nature, his concern for good order in government, his devotion to science and manufacture. He has the reward of his efforts in a mastery of the physical world. He moves across and under the sea, rides the air, and sends his messages round the globe in a few moments. The control of matter has given him the control of men; and the

less advanced peoples have all fallen under his sway, either by direct conquest or by commerce and education. We may thus ascribe the source of European power to an ever-increasing control over nature, and the complementary feature in Asia is that man is there not the master but the victim of nature. In the East, both in the dry desert and in the humid tropics, Nature, the all-powerful, oppresses her children. Her will, in drought and in plenty, is stronger than theirs, and they know it. Hence the patience and fatalism of the Orient ; hence, too, its other-worldliness. We who are born in the North stand firm on the earth, and Nature yields to our touch.

But this generalisation is not the whole truth. We must go further if we wish to reach the heart of the mystery of the difference between the two continents. There is a profound diversity of ethical substance which cannot be truly appreciated by any of the usual standards of comparison ; and it may be surmised that much of the misunderstanding between Asiatic and European arises from the Western propensity to pre-judge the issue by approaching it with an assurance of superiority. Colour, for instance, is often the seeming badge of

inferiority. It is the emblem of physical contrast, but as it is essentially the sign of something more deep-rooted within, we must beware of our own assumptions regarding it. If colour were the only obstacle, it would be surmounted. Outside the Anglo-Saxon world, colour prejudice rarely prevents the marriage of brown and white ; and only, so far as I am aware, in the United States and in British India is the offspring of such a union regarded as a pariah. I would go further and deprecate the use of the word *colour* altogether, for in modern controversy it has become synonymous with *inferiority* ; and if we commence our inquiry with the assumption that the Asiatic is inferior to the European we may as well abandon the search for truth. If we acknowledge that there is room in the human race for different kinds of excellence, if we realise that men may be called to fulfil functions so different that the qualities they possess and the principles they profess are diverse and obviously belong to worlds apart, then we are in a frame of mind to acknowledge the truth that Europe is the offspring of Asia, and that if the son has outstripped the parent in the swift and exuberant enjoyment of life, he has not shown so much appreciation of the meaning of life.

To the parent, the meaning of life is more than life itself.

Nature and climate may account for the Eastern propensity to turn away from life in the endeavour to escape from natural forces too strong for man. In India, especially, man is not the centre of the universe, for he is the impotent plaything of powers in earth and sky far greater than himself. In China the note of humanity is more clearly struck, and China thus presents as great a contrast to India as any that exists in the world. But even in China the importance of man, though it underlies the whole philosophy of Confucius, is not maintained in practical life, and the Chinese are apt to be fatalistic in their attitude to nature. We shall perhaps approach the truth about the three attitudes of India, China, and Europe to the place of man in the universe by saying that the Hindu believes that the visible world is not the real home of the human spirit, that the human spirit is in itself a transient manifestation of the eternal essence which is God, and that nature is a mere illusion. The Chinese, by contrast, accept physical nature as a basic fact, placing mankind in a universe of reality which is none the less governed by invisible forces which they

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must placate and obey. The Chinese meet the powers of nature with passive resistance and thus accept a world which they cannot change. The European boldly places man in the centre of the universe and bids all nature bend to his will, thus taking his stand at the opposite pole from the Hindu, with the Chinese in a posture of characteristic compromise between these two extremes.

Now it may seem as if Providence placed the barriers of mountain, desert, and ocean between Europe and Asia in order to permit mankind to experiment with life and eternity in different ways, each part undisturbed by the other. But mankind, as we have seen, made light of these obstacles. Alexander the Great reached the Punjab before the Christian era. The Mongol, in his great migrations to the east, to the west, and to the south, emerged from his Asiatic steppes and penetrated China, Europe, and India; and the researches of Sir Aurel Stein have recently proved that the Han Dynasty two thousand years ago maintained a regular trading route from Peking to the Mediterranean. Buddhism was carried* by Indian missionaries to China, and Islam was later borne at the point of the sword east and west,

far from its original Arabian home. Each of these movements sowed the seeds of new thought wherever it passed ; but it is doubtful whether any of them so profoundly affected the whole world as the expansion of Europe after the Renaissance. This we must take as the turning-point in the relations of East and West.

Six hundred years ago Europe awoke from the Middle Ages under a new impulse. The revival of letters was an intellectual movement which restored to life the rich humanity of Greece and Rome, and released the mind of man from arid ecclesiastical tyranny. It brought with it the exhilaration of an untried freedom and the zest of an unlimited experiment ; but it took the human soul from its station in a balanced and rounded scheme of things, to deliver it over to every kind of danger and excess. The wonderful system of Catholic theology had given man his place in the universe ; it taught him his duties, allowed for his weaknesses, and at all times exhibited him in so complex a scheme of fixed relations, mundane and celestial, extending beyond the very bounds of thought, that only a temper of absolute humility could carry the burden lightly or look without terror down those endless vistas of law and

providence. From his servant's estate in this great polity he was released by the Renaissance, and became his own master in thought, free to design, build, and inhabit for himself. The enormous nature of the task, which is still in progress, did not at first oppress him ; he was like a child out of school, trying his strength and resource in all kinds of fantastic and extravagant attempts. It was an age of new philosophies, new arts, new cults ; none of them modest or sober, all full of the spirit of bravado, high-towering but not broad-based, erected as monuments to the skill and prowess of the individual. That arrogance and self-sufficiency of craft which by the men of the Renaissance was called virtue was found in a hundred guises.

The warming sun of this new day awoke in Europe new energies ; and, of all its results in human life, none was fraught with greater moment than the launching of enterprise overseas. Having affirmed anew his right to freedom and power, the European set out to explore the world, and in his many voyages he came to lands where the peoples could offer no effective resistance to his intrusion. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Portuguese, the English, the French, and the Dutch embarked on the discovery and ex-

ploitation of the East, and by the middle of the nineteenth century Britain had taken India, Holland the East Indies, while the Eastern empires of France and Portugal had only failed to realise the ambitions of their founders because war in Europe had, especially for the French, deprived them of foreign territories, which once seemed within their grasp. Meanwhile, Russia took the same easterly course by land and had reached the Pacific Ocean by the middle of the nineteenth century, Vladivostok being founded in 1861. The net result was that, when Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India (1876), the East had felt the full weight of European power throughout the whole continent, and only one important manifestation of it was yet to come, in a very different form, in Japan.

If the spirit of adventure, lured by the magic of the East, was the original motive of this phenomenal expansion of Europe, trade became its permanent justification and led to political consequences which were not at first foreseen. Every extension of trade brought with it problems that lay beyond the ordinary scope of commerce. The mere exchange of goods demanded the creation of permanent European settlements on the

coasts of Asia, and these in their turn provoked political difficulties with existing rulers. In practically every controversy of the kind the European Powers, in the end, resorted to force in order to secure satisfaction for their commerce. Wars in their turn brought new territories into European possession, and the pacification and settlement of these territories compelled the conquerors to set up a vast fabric of administration for the civilian government, the dispensing of justice, the economic exploitation, and the military defence of the countries concerned. The wealthy trading corporations of Amsterdam and London—each of them called the East India Company—ruled territories and amassed fortunes on a vast scale, acquiring such power and responsibility that eventually they had to be dispossessed by the Governments of Holland and Great Britain. Throughout the Indies, from Aden to Saigon, the process was carried relentlessly to its appointed end. In China it took a moderate course which left the territorial integrity of China practically intact, though the sovereignty of the Chinese people was limited by a series of treaties in the nineteenth century. Even Japan felt something of the weight of the long arm of Europe, although

alone of all the peoples of Asia, the Japanese learned the secret of power and put it to such good use that within one generation it blossomed into a State capable of meeting the West on its own terms.

Thus the instruments of Western civilisation were brought wholesale to the Orient, and with them the ideas of which they were the symbols and the agents. They have since set up ferments of change throughout the East.⁵ The manifold effects wrought by European influence upon Asia since Vasco da Gama first sighted the shores of India (1498) are not yet in full blossom ; but we can reckon them in the economic revolution embodied in railways, telegraphs, and factories ; in the assault upon ancient tradition by modern education ; in the endeavour to Christianise the Orient by religious missions ; and in widespread political change. Each is significant in its own way, and it is idle to single any one as more profound than the others. They are ubiquitous in Asia and have clearly wrought something more than superficial results. Nor are they to be dismissed as the triumph of materialism alone ; for no organisation of mere material forces could have launched the expansion of Europe, maintained it for five centuries, and

given it such proof of innate power. Therefore those who proclaim the conquest of Asia as a victory of steel and gold, won by the rifle and machine gun over obsolete arms, give a totally inadequate reason for this momentous event and miss its significance.

When the restless "Ocean Men"—to give the Europeans their earliest Chinese title—landed in Asia they carried with them something greater than the visible cargoes of their ships. Unwittingly, perhaps, they bore the message of European thought, the principles of science, the ideals of politics, and the teaching of the Bible. This invisible cargo, once brought on shore, acted like a leaven on minds little accustomed to such learning; and although the ferment grew but slowly, it worked with a power that far eclipsed visible victories of material things. Against an attack such as this, unexpected and persistent, the nations of the East offered a stubborn resistance, but their defence weakened as the attack grew in force, and one by one they fell before it. India, sustained by the enduring power of Hinduism, has never completely yielded; and beneath the political strife of to-day we can see a deeper struggle between tradition and the desire for change—a struggle which

will be long maintained. China fell an easier victim because the country was already ripe for a change of domestic regime and possessed no last line of defence against novelty and change such as Hinduism gave to India. Japan capitulated deliberately, and accomplished a revolution in her own life as proof of her respect for the greater prestige of European ideals.

These were not the victories of force, though force was on the side of the victors : they were the triumphs of one mind over another, of a mind alive over a mind asleep. The most piercing weapons in the armoury of Europe were not of iron and steel ; they were the invisible projectiles of the mind carrying explosive novelties of thought into the heart of the immobile East and blowing up the very foundations of her ancient life.

But what of the result ? We shall see something of the consequences to Asia in the next three chapters, which are devoted to India, China, and Japan. Meanwhile there are certain general observations to record.

1. The origin of political economic and religious change in the East is to be found in the influence of Western thought ; but its actual authors have been, in almost every case, intelligent and politically conscious native

minorities who imposed, or are now attempting to impose, reforms of alien origin on their own people. In no country in Asia has reform arisen from the mass movement of popular feeling. This is not in itself unusual ; for it has been the experience of every nation, East and West, that the driving force comes from a group of determined reformers whose power lies in crusading zeal and not in the weight of numbers. But in the East, where the political mind is still adolescent, the reformer encounters the difficulty that the mass which he has moved to revolt has little conception of what reform means and is apt to suppose that rebellion was engineered merely for the purpose of exchanging one ruler for another and not in order to establish government on the popular will. This is undoubtedly the reason why the premature attempts to create parliamentary government in China failed after the revolution of 1912, and why the field has since been so largely held by local despots ruling by military force. Something of the same moral can be observed in Persia, if not in Turkey, while the fate of the late Amir of Afghanistan reveals the danger of bidding an Eastern people too hastily to defy its own traditions.

This is just as true of religious and economic change as it is of political reform. The problem is to guarantee permanence where the essential foundations of the new regime are lacking. The late Mr. K. T. Paul, an able and sincere Indian Christian, said that what he most feared was the undermining of Hinduism, which had been a great cohesive force, by the disintegrating effect of the Western spirit of scientific inquiry before any adequate substitute such as Christianity could take its place. Herein he seems to me to have undervalued the innate survival-power of Hinduism, but the danger signal he made is one which the East dare not ignore. Russia has found, in the Five Year Plan, that you can instal an American machine in a night, but it takes years to train a Russian mechanic to use it. And the profounder experiments in political and religious reform in the East will succeed or fail by the response they elicit from the mass of the people, whose minds are not yet awake to the issues involved nor aware of the active part designed for them in the maintenance of the new regime.

It is clear, then, that the leaders of every modern movement in the East are in danger of succeeding too quickly with revolution

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because the people do not care, and of failing to achieve the subsequent and necessary reforms because the people are not ready to take part. This easy success of revolution leads to the second general observation.

2. The most conspicuous feature in the modern East is the dethronement of the tradition of autocracy and the search for an alternative in some form of popular government based upon the representative principle. The belief in the divine right has lost its early strength, being undermined by the same forces of education and popular enlightenment which have destroyed it in Europe. The Chinese have a saying that the maker of images does not worship the gods because he knows what they are made of, and even the passive masses of Asia are beginning to share this scepticism of the educated classes. The Japanese oligarchs who wrote the Imperial Constitution of 1889 may have believed that the line of emperors had been "unbroken from ages eternal," that the emperor was "sacred and inviolable," and that the Japanese people would joyfully accept a constitutional monarch as the object of religious veneration. But they know to-day that the secret spring from which all "dangerous thoughts" of revolution now

flow is the growing popular scepticism which gnaws like an acid the very foundation of this belief. In China, too, the Mandate of Heaven from which the dynasty formerly derived its authority to rule has lost its power, and the attempt to restore the emperor to-day would encounter the formidable obstacle of popular disbelief. The peasant might accept a new despot as the rightful heir to the Dragon Throne, but the growing phalanx of the alert and educated minorities who originally made the revolution would be ranged in solid and determined opposition which in the end would overthrow the Imperial regime once more. Yuan Shih-Kai made the attempt in 1915 and failed because he misread the spirit of the times ; and to-day only a personality of almost supernatural power could renew it.

Despite this undeniable evidence, there are many observers who remained unconvinced of the reality or permanence of this change. It is said that the essential conservatism of Asia will re-assert itself, that progress and reaction are European words which lose their meaning east of Suez, that the worship of power is the twin of the Oriental's deep religious interest, and that personal rule is the only government which he understands.

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We are again and again reminded, moreover, that it was a great European, not an Asiatic, who said that man is a political animal, and John Stuart Mill said that "no one believes that every people is capable of working every sort of political institutions." There is, therefore, no certainty in all this which justifies dogmatic assertion or confident prophecy; but it is certain that Asia is in a new mood, not dissimilar from the temper of our own Renaissance, and that the peoples of the East are now launched on a sea of experiment. Over their new enterprises hangs a great query to which there is as yet no clear answer. But the European sceptic, who doubts the permanence of what he sees before him to-day in this changing Asia, must take account of the fundamental fact that this static world, which has been so often described as immobile, is on the move; and the past history of the East has shown that when Asia moves, it moves far.

To sum up this second general observation, we survey in modern Asia a whole world in the throes of change. Tradition has been overthrown, and in form, at least, a new Asia arises on the ashes of the old. Is it indeed a new Asia? Is it more than a passing fever due to the alien virus of Western ideas?

Who shall say? In no Asiatic country has the process been at work long enough to give clear results. In some, dictators have merely taken the place of deposed monarchs; in others, chaos is the only visible result of democracy; and in none has the new era any firm foundation in the habits and character of the people. The political novelty, in most cases an exotic importation, is still unstable; and if political change had been the only new feature in this new Asia, we might be justified in regarding it as a temporary aberration from established ways. But it does not stand alone. Education of the people accompanies and strengthens it; the emancipation of women shows that it has a social counterpart of great significance; and the economic development of all countries in which it has taken place has already made wide breaches in ancient custom. And so, if we may not yet proclaim the passing of the old order, we must acknowledge that Asia has a vision of the new.

3. The third general observation which we must make is that the East has paid a heavy price for its new experience. Not only has it lost faith in some of its most ancient traditions, but it is in danger of losing its sense of beauty and the craftsman-

ship which made the carpets of Persia, the silks of Benares, and the porcelain of China the admiration of the world. Asia seems to have lost heart in the competition with Western products and to have suffered a corruption of taste. There are few things more depressing than the furnishings of an Indian maharajah's palace or the royal apartments of Siam, where the tawdry ugliness of the Victorian Age has effaced all native beauty. Mr. Lowes Dickinson³ tells us that in Japan, as in India and China, but in Japan in pre-eminent degree, he was "struck by the rout of æsthetic taste before the Western invasion. In old Japan, roughly, everything was beautiful; in modern Japan everything is hideous." The Tokaido road, immortalised in the fifty-five prints of Hiroshige, has already lost much of its serene and intriguing charm, and the landscape round Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe is deeply scarred by the wounds of industrialism. We shall see, however, in the chapter on Japan, that art still survives; but the general impression, as in Bombay and Canton, is that "Japanese taste is altogether disoriented as soon as it has to deal with European and American conventions." In another passage Mr. Lowes Dickinson sug-

gests that the artistic impulse was already dying before the inroad of the West, and that "the taste had long ceased to exist, and had become a mere habit with no power of resistance."

I think we may add a further surmise of a more hopeful tone. It is surely presumption to deny that the soil of Asia, once so fertile, will not blossom again. It may only need fertilisation; and therefore it is possible to see even in the worst manifestations of Western influence in the East something more than a depressing vitiation of taste. It may be that we are witnessing the beginning of a process whereby the spirit of Asia is arousing itself to new life under the fertilising touch of Western thought. There is many a process in nature which, unlovely in itself, yet leads to beauty; and in the apparent decay of autumn there is always the promise of spring. So may it be in Asia to-day.

4. Our fourth general remark is that the political prestige of the West has suffered some decline during the past thirty years. The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905 struck the first blow; but, as to that, it must be remarked that Russia was never a *representative* European Power, though always

reckoned as a Great Power, that the Manchurian War was fought far from Russia's European base, and that in consequence the military repute of Japan was probably reckoned too high after her comparatively short struggle. A more damaging blow was struck by the Great War, which Asia regarded as a civil war of the West—as, indeed, it was—and which so greatly impaired the apparent material power of Europe that the hastier interpreters of the East were prone to proclaim it as the end of all Western prestige. Even more injurious to the pride of the West is the present disarray of Europe, in which it almost appears as if the very authors of political progress had failed in their most congenial task.

These factors have to some extent dispelled the Asiatic fear of our material power. None the less, the individual European is still known in the East as the not unworthy heir of great traditions, and he personally enjoys great authority and respect. On that unshaken foundation the future can be built with greater moral security than any past material triumph ever gave. And since the Western man to-day approaches the problem of East and West in a frame of mind which accepts, more generously than ever before,

the fundamental rights of Asia, the prospect of genuine co-operation is one of hope.

In all these aspects we see the different facets of the problem which now confronts East and West. With our predisposition to make politics the chief end of man, we find in public affairs the principal focus of interest ; but enough has been said in this brief survey of the historical background to show that the political factor in the problem does not lie at the heart of the matter. Political difficulties, indeed, often arise from a failure to appreciate differences in culture and mentality which lie deep in the ages of history. A true appreciation of another nation's culture is part of the whole equipment of understanding. There are ways in which a crisis in the international relations between East and West may be, if not solved, at least circumvented by non-political means ; and many an alien governor in Eastern countries has found that the source of real power lay, not in the mere exercise of force, but in personal contact with, and intimate knowledge of, the people under his charge. I have little doubt that much of Lord Ronaldshay's authority as Governor of Bengal, during his remarkably successful tenure of that office, was derived from his

success in combining firmness in action with an indefinable personal intuition of the Hindu mind.

In the remaining chapters of this book we shall not ignore the political factor in the future of Asia, and we shall have occasion to extract some political lessons from the recent crisis in the Far East; but we shall endeavour throughout to place politics in their true relation to the sum of human activity. In India, especially, it will be necessary to observe a right perspective, for there the political issue is so urgent that it tends to conceal the essential character of the whole problem and to suggest that the future relations of East and West—as they are found in India—will be placed on a stable foundation whenever the constitutional position of India in the British Commonwealth is established. More, much more than that is required, as we shall see in the next chapter. Moreover, it is the part of wisdom to remember that, even in the political field, something more than the official relation between one government and another is involved. Indeed, if we confine our view of the Chinese problem, for instance, to the limited questions of extra-territoriality, concessions, trading rights, and their like, we

shall neither see it steadily nor see it whole. We shall find that the modern approach, for the liberal nations of England and America, will lead us more surely to genuine amity if it follows the broad line of sympathetic co-operation in the whole task of Chinese reconstruction, especially in these fields which official punctilio usually forbids diplomatists to enter. The more precise meaning of this will be seen in the third chapter.

Finally, it will be no small part of our purpose to estimate the rôle which the League of Nations, as the agent of the system of collective conciliation, can play in improving the political relations of East and West.

CHAPTER II

INDIA : THE CENTRAL BATTLEGROUND

If the river be a mirage that I see
Then what need for me
Of a ford ?

TUKA RAM [1608-49].

NOWHERE is the contrast between East and West sharper than in India. India, representative only of herself, is an altogether different world, to which Europe finds no easy access and in which there is much that other Asiatics neither value nor understand. Indeed, one suspects that many of the generalisations about East and West are really drawn from Indian evidence, and are not so apt for other parts of Asia. India is apart from the rest of the world, including most of Asia, with a peculiar kind of difference more profound than any that separates China from England or Japan from ancient Greece or Spain. When the Western man, be he Spaniard, Scot, or American, approaches the Hindu world, he finds himself in another element ; and, as the swimmer must unclthe

himself before he can move in water, so the European must abandon the whole Western vesture of his mind before he can truly appreciate India. Standards of value are here reversed, the facts of life become *Maya*, or illusion, and the figure of man, so vital, so self-reliant in Europe, fades to a shadow before the invisible powers.

To the eye of the West, the Indian East is a vast phantasmagoria. Nature and religion alike appear in strange forms, less susceptible to any known measurement than the precise manifestations of Occidental mind and matter. There is no clear frontier between myth and fact. Legend is history ; and the Hindu accepts the narrative of the Mahabharata as the truth of history more readily than any scientific record of human progress founded on the careful research of the historian.¹ The Indian Sagas are to him the precious chronicles of a drama staged in the era when men were as gods and gods were as men. They portray the golden age in the same manner in which the Homeric epics describe the spacious days when human heroes strove with the Olympians ; and, to the Hindu mind, they are true, not because they spring from any reliable historical source, but because they reveal one of the

fundamental truths of the universe : namely, the significance and power of the invisible and supernatural world. The Hindu reads the Ramayana, not as an objective tale of great events, but as the reflection upon a majestic background of his own inner experience. The incarnation of Gautama in the Buddha, or the Immaculate Conception itself, are not mysteries but realities to him ; and in our own day, Mahatma Gandhi figures in countless Indian minds, not as a political person, but as the reincarnation of a *rishi*, if not an actual god. So closely interwoven are religion and experience that the world of reality is not to be explained in its own terms, but in those of the religious imagination. Thus history as a merely human record has little or no place in the Indian mind. The recital of facts is a profitless occupation ; for the material world is not a fact, it is an illusion. The doctrine of *Maya*, which proclaims the world as illusion, is the central feature of this thought ; and it is only comprehensible to us when we consider it as the product of its own environment. The origin of our minds is very different. The West cannot conceive of Nature as Illusion. Facts are significant to us, and we must work out our salvation by them

and through them in a manner not indeed wholly foreign to the Oriental, but not characteristic of him.

Contemplating this antinomy, where significance and reality seem at war, there are some who maintain that the Hindu is nearer eternal truth than any European can ever be ; and one Western observer recently asked, "What is valuable, what essential—significance or facts? Significance alone ; facts as such are wholly irrelevant. Thus India, with its tendency to producing myths, has, judged from the angle of life, chosen the better part, as opposed to precise Europe."² For my part I deny the implied judgment of European inferiority ; for this is no matter of better or worse, but of two minds with wholly different destinies. History has brought them into close contact, with results as yet unknown, which are fraught with great import for the whole human race.

As we proceed to inquire what this contact has so far done for East and West alike in India, it is vital to remember the other-worldly nature of the people who bore the first brunt of the onset of the West. This is the very core of the Hindu mind ; and its final reaction to impulses derived from our world of reality will exercise a more powerful

influence on the future relations of England and India than any of the political controversies that now rage between them. Indeed, the fate of all reform in India, no matter what kind of constitution is now set up, will be decided, not in the political field, but by the reaction of Hinduism to the religion and science of the West. If the Brahman leaders of India, under this pressure which now bears heavily upon them, decide to adapt their orthodoxy to modern demands, we shall be able to say that the West has won its greatest victory. If Hinduism takes the opposite course and seeks a renewal of power by a revival of ancient doctrine without uprooting its social evils, and thus rejects what we may call the message of reform, the political and social future of the Indian peoples will continue to follow a lonely road, in isolation from the rest of the globe. The available evidence seems to point to the former and better result expressed in a compromise which, in appearance at all events, will maintain the historic continuity of Hinduism. Hinduism has ever been pliant and adaptable in doctrine, if rigid in its social action; and it will probably adapt itself once more to a force which it cannot utterly defeat. And we may note the

significant fact that the Western attack has already made such breaches in ancient custom as to shake the ramparts of defence.

The Hindu world was the first in Asia to meet the onset of Western thought ; and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when this tide began to flow in strength, India was weak. The Mogul Empire had fallen ; Indian thought had become stagnant in the grip of orthodoxy, and the small minority of those whose minds were really alive sought inspiration in vain from indigenous sources. For a brief period the ideal of " a union of Hindu and European learning " attracted the best minds. Warren Hastings had founded the Calcutta Madrasa to encourage Islamic studies, and the creation of the Sanskrit College at Benares denoted another attempt to revive the failing life of indigenous learning. But Indians themselves had lost faith in their own heritage ; and the scholarly Bengali, for instance, seemed ready to reject his own language as " a fantastic thing, unintelligible, foolish, and full of unmeaning, vain pedantry." When Raja Ram Mohan Roy, David Hare, and certain British missionaries offered him new life through the teaching of English, he welcomed it with open arms. Thus the

field was prepared for Macaulay's famous *Minute on Education* (1835), in which he denounced as waste of time every moment spent on Sanskrit or the study of Hinduism. He proclaimed his "firm belief that if our plans of education (in English) are followed up, there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence." So little did he know the power of Hinduism! But, in the same *Minute*, he made a prophecy as true as his estimate of Indian religion was false. Our Indian fellow-subjects, he said, "having become instructed in European knowledge may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not; but . . . whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history."

Now, beneath the arrogant and easy generalisations of Macaulay there was a profound truth and the expression of a great need. India, as we have seen, needed a new life. "Never since the coming of the Aryans had indigenous culture sunk so low. Learning was almost dead, and the stream of spiritual life flowed almost unnoticed through a tangled growth of coarse idolatry. Infanticide and human sacrifice were rife, the consummation of child marriage was

legally permissible at any age ; the obscenities and prostitution associated with temple worship were openly encouraged and enjoyed, and the re-marriage of widows was forbidden by Hindu law.”³ It seemed as if reform could not come from within. And since the weapon of reform was there at hand, in the shape of Western language and culture, the Indian seized it with zest and, aided by the patronage of the British Government, attacked the fortress of orthodoxy. The attack was delivered with such impetuous force, and the defence so supine, that within a few years it swept all before it. The old was condemned and the new exalted to heaven. Hinduism was dismissed as mere superstition ; Sanskrit learning was despised, and the whole system of social obligation and ritual in which Hindu society lived and moved and had its being was undermined by reckless iconoclasm. Thus the national faith in old morality and religion was dethroned, but the new worship was a god with feet of clay ; and the generation of reformers who originally set out to re-create the old by fusion with the new soon found that their work was snatched from them by revolutionaries who sought to destroy native learning without heed to the consequences.

The movement swept on its way unchecked for some time ; but when it was seen that not reform but anarchy was its goal, the leaders of Indian thought, both reformers and conservatives, were driven to take stock of the new situation. From their varied interpretations of the trouble different conclusions arose, and it may be convenient here to state succinctly the five results of the Indian Awakening which began roughly in 1800 and is not over yet. First came intellectual and moral anarchy ; second, the recoil from extremes with a tendency to reaction ; third, the revival and defence of orthodoxy, which none the less had to acknowledge the need for reform ; fourth, the penetration of Christian doctrine and with it the rise of social reform ; and fifth and last, the awakening of political ambition. These are not stated in their true chronological order, nor are they independent of one another. The influence of Christianity, for instance, though not responsible for the early anarchy, runs through the other four, and began to operate from 1813, when for the first time the missionaries were given full freedom to settle and work in India. Political ambition was the last in time, though the seed was sown a century ago in the decision to educate India

in English. And social reform was comparatively late in coming, owing more to Christian influence than to official policy or to the demands of the earlier generation of Indian politicians.⁴

A complete account of these movements could only be given in a comprehensive history of India in the nineteenth century.⁵ For such a task there is no room in these pages ; and we must therefore select the significant, even at the cost of ignoring many phenomena which are important in themselves. We are concerned here with India as the theatre of the drama of the East and West ; and we may find the most noteworthy feature of the whole scene now being enacted in the contrast between two of the great results of the Awakening which may be stated thus : During the time when Hinduism, under the increasing stress of the modern inroad of Western culture, was turning back to the springs of its own life and seeking there new strength with which to resist the attack, the educated classes who formed the politically minded minority of India, were demanding with ever-growing insistence the wholesale adoption of Western institutions of government. The orthodox leaders were fighting to retain an essentially

aristocratic and hierarchic system, while the political reformers sought to establish a new Indian society on a foundation of democracy. Yet both parties were and are often found in alliance against the Government of India, and their co-operation for the political purpose of opposition to the alien ruler tends to conceal the fundamental hostility of their ideals.

There can be little doubt of their essential difference of aim. If orthodox Hinduism retains control of Indian society, it will not consent to give real political power to the masses under the leadership of men who professedly have renounced tradition and accepted the new representative principle. And conversely, the advocates of popular government cannot in the end accept the social hegemony of the Brahman ; for, if they did, they would find that the *imperium in imperio* of orthodoxy would deprive them of all political authority. In this war of ideas, and not in the struggle between the Congress Party and the Government of India, lies the real problem of East and West in India to-day. I do not suggest that it is not vital to the moral prestige of the British people to find a solution of the problem of India's position in the British Common-

wealth ; nor do I deny that the failure to solve it would react heavily on the whole future relation of East and West ; still less do I ignore the Hindu-Musulman feud which is the immediate obstacle to constitutional progress ; but I am convinced that the real battle is being fought, not in the Legislative Assembly in Delhi, nor in Parliament, but in the soul of India.

It may be said that this picture is drawn in lines too harsh and simple to be true. The problem is too complex to be stated in terms of a campaign in which the opposing forces are clearly defined and marshalled like armies in manœuvre. Some of the forces appear now on the one side now on the other ; and between the main bodies there is the large and slowly awaking mass of the Indian peoples whose traditional allegiance, let it be remembered, belongs to the orthodox side. Moreover, the penetration of Western ideas moves apace. Every new railway opened, every factory set up, every film displayed on the screen, every student that goes abroad, tends to increase the area and the speed of change. In a scene so changing Hinduism has not, in fact, stood still. Its leaders have read some of the signs of the times, and are being driven by a sense of

self-preservation to put their house in order. "After a long winter of some centuries," says one distinguished writer of the modern school of thought, "we are to-day in one of the creative periods of Hinduism. We are beginning to look upon our ancient faith with fresh eyes. We feel that our society is in a condition of unstable equilibrium. There is much wood that is dead and diseased that has to be cleared away. Leaders of Hindu thought and practice are convinced that the times require, not a surrender of the basic principles of Hinduism, but a restatement of them with special reference to the needs of a more complex and more mobile social order. Such an attempt will only be the repetition of a process which has occurred a number of times in the history of Hinduism. The work of readjustment is in process. Growth is slow when roots are deep. But those who light a little candle in the darkness will help to make the whole sky aflame."⁶

How much truth is there in this prophecy? No one can answer; but, while we may agree that to-day is a "creative period in Hinduism," we are concerned to know whether the leaders of Hindu thought *and practice* really desire to meet the needs of a more complex and mobile social order. If

they are preparing to reform caste, that rigid Hindu prison, and to make it an instrument of progress they will do more to release the energies of the Indian people for all the tasks of life than any of the political reformers. It would be a bold stroke of policy—but one almost beyond imagination—for the Brahmans to revise their wonted attitude to the unemancipated proletariat of the Untouchables and to place themselves in the van of real progress by reviving the historic function of caste. The cruelty of the caste system is a blot upon its virtues and has no relation to its original character. Why should not caste, which was originally an appropriate division of Indian society by occupations, be so transformed as to make it the foundation of a system of popular representation more appropriate to India than our fashion of territorial constituencies? Representation by function may be just as good as representation by geographical area, and the Fascists of Italy have shown that, for a politically immature people, it may offer a more stable foundation for public affairs.

The European may say that the solution lies in the words of Jesus, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's." Politics

and religion should not mix. But that is advice which India appears to reject, because everything Indian is governed by religion. Hinduism is as much a social system and a body of social obligations, as it is a profession of faith. Nay, more, it is a religion which tends to reduce all realities of human life to a mirage, and with them politics becomes a matter of so little concern as to make it immaterial whether an autocrat, a Soviet, or a Parliament rules over them. In a word :

If the river be a mirage that I see
Then what need for me
Of a ford ?⁷

But we must not pursue the "mirage" conception of Indian life too far, for it leads in the end to the negation of everything that makes for human progress. It is not, in fact, the only criterion, though it is perhaps the deepest and most characteristic of the many motives in Hindu thought. Hinduism is so multiple and various that it may be said to contain something of all religions and to place its ban on none ; and in the *bhakti* conception of holiness there is a way of life not unlike the Christian's way of salvation through service of God and man at once.

Here is the matter of a fair compromise. Let the Hindu saint continue to give his message of the eternal value of the invisible world. Many a European has done as much and has reached heights of mysticism as lofty as any in Indian literature. But even Hinduism allots different functions to different periods of the mundane life of the individual man. He is first a child, then a learner, then a man of action, and only finally seeks salvation in that life of contemplation which reveals to him the secrets of the Eternal Mind. What the political reformers demand is that, in his period as a man of affairs, the Indian shall have a new theatre of action ; and since the design of that theatre is now under discussion it is worth while to consider whether it may not be found by reviving, transforming, and extending institutions already known to India in the past. The suggested reform of caste and its use in popular representation is no violation of Indian tradition. Even the Hindu saint may, as a young man, have sat in his caste Panchayat, the recognised council of his fellow-members in the same group, to administer their common affairs. And it is manifestly appropriate to suggest that this ancient organ of representation be

revived and strengthened to take part in the future Constitution of India.

Now, all this suggests that there is material for a satisfactory settlement between the forces of tradition and the advocates of change. Doubtless, as Professor Radhakrishnan reminded us, "growth is slow when roots are deep," and we must nurse no illusions nor be over-sanguine in expecting any deep or early change of heart in the orthodox leaders. But let us see what has already been done in the political field ; for we shall find there considerable evidence of the growth of a public opinion with which, sooner or later, the Brahman must reckon, and which to-day he does not altogether ignore. The scene is, in fact, slowly changing : yet not so slowly, for when we add up the sum of what has been achieved in the span of an ordinary life-time, comparing that brief moment with India's long existence, we see a whole nation on the move.

So we return to the visible world, to the physical stage on which this great drama of conflict is played ; and, as the dramatist sets his scene in his instructions to the company of players, we must have in mind the principal features of India as we endeavour to read the meaning of its political

life. Here, again, we must select : there is not room for the whole panorama in these narrow pages ; and in selecting we must find again the significant. Now, the first significant thing is that though India is spiritually apart from the rest of Asia, like a peak raised to almost invisible heights above the plain, it is an epitome of its own continent in the infinite variety of its peoples, colours, climates, products, and speech. Indeed, we shall not begin to guess the truth about physical India unless we bear in mind that it *is* a continent in itself, speaking twelve languages and two hundred dialects, nursing in its breast two children that cannot agree, and giving shelter to a score of lesser sects, each one of whom alone would make an imposing religious fraternity in Europe. It is a land of sharp contrast in which north and south seem to meet and repel each other, in which East and West come to closest grips, and in which Madras is further from Peshawar, in climate, physical character, and human thought than Stockholm is from Seville. But the greatest of all the contradictions in India is that over this diversity is spread a greater unity, which is not immediately evident because it failed historically to find expression in any political cohesion to

make the country one, but which is so great a reality, and so powerful, that even the Musulman world in India has to confess that it has been deeply affected by coming within its influence. It is the unity of religious feeling, the binding force of Hinduism.

Political unity, on the other hand, has never existed, and is only now being created by the play of various forces among which are, in their true chronological order : the English language, the growth of communications by rail and post, economic development, and the rise of political nationalism. We have seen how the English language was made the principal instrument of education, and its most important consequence in the political field has been the part which it has played in providing a *lingua franca* for the different peoples of India who otherwise had no common medium. Thus our language and the rule of the British Raj have brought about in India a result which no other force in history had achieved ; political India was brought to birth, and united India became an accessible ideal. The effect upon the political task of Great Britain can be measured by comparing the declaration by which Queen Victoria proclaimed her purpose, on

assuming the title of Empress of India in 1876, with the proclamation of the British Government in 1917. The Queen pledged England to give India good government, justice, toleration, and progress ; she opened for Indians the door to administrative employment in their own country ; but she said no word of democracy or of a form of Indian Government responsible to any authority but the Crown and the Imperial Parliament. Political India, as we know it, still lay in the womb of time. By 1917, so greatly had the problem changed, that the Government of the day took a new objective in "the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The course by which this conclusion was reached is worth tracing briefly, for it reveals how far Western ideas had penetrated the Indian mind, and how the new India had compelled England to change her traditional view of the destiny of the East.

The change was little short of a revolution. At the time of the Mutiny (1857) there was little or no political nationalism in India, and few, indeed, were those who conceived of its government as other than a permanent autocracy. The dawn of Indian political

consciousness was not seen for nearly a quarter of a century afterwards ; and when it came in the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, its heralds were Englishmen as well as Indians. When Allan Octavian Hume drafted the resolutions of the first Indian National Congress in that year, he was an alien pioneer showing his Indian fellow-subjects the English road to political power ; and the Congress, which he inspired, represented only the nascent nationalism, sharpened by political discontent, of a comparatively small class of educated Indians. So meagre was the power of the Congress in its own country that it exercised but little influence over the course of Indian policy or the character of the Indian Constitution. The legislative bodies were little more than consultative committees attached to the executive government, and the number of Indians holding responsible positions was small. The half century which lay between the Mutiny and the reforms of 1909 witnessed great economic changes accompanied by a growth of political consciousness which prepared the stage for the actors now performing on it. It was a period of growing prosperity and comparative calm in which the agitation now so familiar only began to

raise its head towards the end of the nineteenth century.

In the generation which has since elapsed, two significant figures stand out: Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Tilak was a Brahman of the Deccan who realised forty years ago that the weakness of Indian nationalism lay in its almost complete divorce from popular feeling, and he set out to link the anti-British agitation with beliefs and superstitions of the people. He made it appear that political murder had a religious sanction, that the popular elephant-headed god, Ganesh, held in special honour the assassin of the foreign tyrant; and thus he brought a new reinforcement of popular sentiment to the movement for political reform which had hitherto pursued a sedate, orderly, and constitutional course. Tilak was therefore a portent in India at the turn of the century, and not till Mahatma Gandhi appeared was there any leader of such magnetic power in the land. But even Tilak's power was local and ephemeral compared with the authority enjoyed for a while by his strangely contrasted successor. Tilak was a Brahman, seeking to defend his orthodoxy against the West by expelling the alien ruler: Gandhi is a man

of lower caste—a bannia, or merchant—in whom the spiritual contest between East and West in India seems to be incarnate. A reformer of abuses, he has many a time proved the sincerity of his desire to better mankind by personal sacrifice ; a representative Hindu (though not a Brahman), he yet draws inspiration from the Sermon on the Mount and the Saints of Christendom ; a man of undeniable courage, he has none the less quailed before the supreme call of leadership and taken willing refuge in prison as a welcome escape from responsibility. Driven by circumstances to enter the political arena, he found the task either uncongenial or beyond his powers ; and, with the single exception of his Pact with Lord Irwin, he has made no constructive contribution to the political problem in the past few years. Shrewdness and saintliness wrestle for the mastery within him, and leave him, too often, with the worst of both worlds.

Yet he is a force making for stability rather than subversion ; and there is little doubt that, without him, the disturbances in India would have been far greater during past years than they have actually been. He created a great movement and has held

it in check at times, though at other times it has escaped his control, to work havoc with the peace of India. What, then, was his true doctrine, and what his purpose? At a guess it was to give Hinduism new life by fusing it with Christian ethics: to release the oppressed classes by changing the heart of the Brahman: and thereby to create a new India which could bring the message of reconciliation to a disordered world. In another age, where the political factor did not thrust its perplexing influence into the life of man, he might have been a supreme teacher, born to promote that spiritual reform which has more than once in its long history saved Hinduism from dissolution. And if he has not fulfilled that supreme function, it is because he strayed, by a natural impulse, from the path of the religious reformer into the jungle of politics where his inner guidance failed him. Despite his political failure in the constitutional field there is no shadow of doubt that the influence of Mahatma Gandhi will remain, not in virtue of his spinning-wheel or his homespun, but in virtue of his personal example. It is idle to inquire what personality is, whence it comes, or how it can move mountains; but the fact remains that the most novel feature in the

whole landscape of India during the past fifteen years has been the awakening of the masses to their political and economic condition. That awakening is Mahatma Gandhi's work, performed by the invisible force of personality. Thousands, if not millions, of Indians have understood for the first time during these years, vaguely and ignorantly, the meaning of the word "political"; and wherever Gandhi passed, he left behind him an imprint on all minds which will not rapidly be effaced. Therefore, despite all the extravagance, chicanery, corruption, and cruelty of the Non-Co-operation and Congress movements, the net sum of it all is not evil and goes to the credit of its creator.⁸

Mazzini made the soul of united Italy, but it was Cavour who gave it body. Gandhi is the Mazzini of the India of to-day, but where is the Cavour? In that question lies the whole problem. There is a movement towards unity, a growing sense of nationhood, and a desire for progress and order in modern India; but the movement has few leaders worthy of it. This poverty of leadership is due to historic causes. Political life in India is of recent growth: the National Congress itself was only born fifty years ago, and the soil upon which it grew had never

been fertilised by political thought or experience. Historic India was not a political country. Throughout the ages she has been accustomed to accept government imposed from above ; and the mind of her people has never been stirred till recently by political ambition. The literature of India contains no political treatise comparable with Aristotle's *Politics*, Plato's *Republic*, Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, Burke's *Essays and Speeches*, Mill's *Liberty*, or Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist*. This shows that the habit of political thought has never grown in India. It is only another way of saying that India is a religious not a political continent. The rich soil of political theory in which the Greek States grew, and the massive work in political administration which gave Rome her predominance, provided Europe with a prepared field of statecraft which is almost wholly lacking in India.

It is obvious to-day that India is making up for lost time. But despite the fact that national movements now grow with a rapidity never before known in history, and that the speed of reform must contrive to keep pace with them, the requirements of sound politics cannot be manufactured overnight, if, indeed, they can be manufactured

at all. They are plants of slow growth, not inanimate machine-made objects, and they must have time and opportunity to ripen. The Indian, reading these pages, will seize the word *opportunity* and ask whether England has given him any adequate chance to gain the experience required. His criticism is just. We have been so engrossed in giving India what we called good government—and it was good—that we did not awake till late in the day to the fact that our form of government could not last for ever. Having failed to foresee it we did not begin to prepare for it until recent years. But the Indian, who thus convicts us of inadequacy, must be reminded that his own awakening also came late in time, and that his forefathers never sought from us what he now demands. Therefore recrimination silences itself and we pass to the problem before us.⁹

We have already seen how the mind of India, even in the act of recoiling from the contact of Western culture, underwent its influence; and in that process lies the inevitable source of change, if not of progress. When we turn to the visible world of politics and administration some of the ablest witnesses find little evidence of improvement. The Indian Civil Service, for instance,

acknowledges the awakening of political interest, but finds in the deterioration of the general administration a heavily counter-vailing weight on the debit side of the account ; and some of its most experienced members are wont to say that the gravest result of recent changes has been the peasant's loss of faith in the governing power of the *Sirkar*. But it must be remembered that the Service itself was taught to regard politics as the enemy of good administration, and it therefore looks with a sceptical eye towards the promised land of Indian nationalism, where it foresees the decay of its own high achievement. By a strange irony the Service itself has greatly helped India on the road to that goal, for during the past ten years it has not only loyally "worked the Reforms," but its members adapted themselves with skill and success to the unfamiliar tasks of parliamentary life, in the Legislative Assembly and in the Legislative Councils.

In the India of to-day it is emphatically not true that "whate'er is best administered is best." The test of administrative standards is not valid : nor is it just to ignore the unsuitability of some of our British methods to Indian conditions. Let no one imagine that I belittle the achievements of England

in India. They are all historic, magnificent, undeniable. But, since we are now approaching the greatest of all her accomplishments, which even Macaulay foresaw as the "proudest in English history," when the apprentice whom we have taught claims his right to be a master-craftsman on equal terms with his teacher in the workshop of politics, England must conceive of her mission in India no longer as an alien ruler whose standards she has a right to impose upon a subject people. The day has not yet come when England can abdicate her sovereignty. India is not a lost dominion, but a dominion in the making, long though that process be. It was admitted above, and the debates of the Round Table Conference have revealed it as a fact, that India is not prepared to take over the whole sovereign responsibility now resting on Parliament ; but the experience of the past ten years has shown that the sense of responsibility grows in proportion as responsibility itself is given. The more completely Indians are made responsible for their own political and social welfare, the surer and speedier will be the growth of their capacity ; but until they suffer and pay for their own mistakes, there will be no real progress.

Now this is not a constitutional textbook, nor a report on political reform. These subjects have been discussed in many books of recent date which are recommended to the reader in the Appendix. They cover a wide field which, when surveyed, reveals the destined line of advance. Federal India is the goal, but the road to it proves longer and harder than it appeared in the enthusiasm of the first session of the Round Table Conference. Never was it so true as to-day that "tasks in hours of insight willed, shall be in days of gloom fulfilled." The optimism of 1931 arose from a delighted surprise at finding that the glowing conception of an All-India Federation was acclaimed by all three parties at the Conference Table, the British Government, the Indian leaders, and, most significant of all, the Indian Princes. Here the Princes cast the die of a great decision. Their action seemed to remove the toughest of all obstacles to the federal ideal ; and it was natural, that in the exhilaration of an historic moment, other difficulties should fall out of sight. The Princes have since had their second thoughts ; and, between the first and second sessions of the Conference, they showed signs of repenting their decision. But the wiser among them

saw that they could not turn back, and to-day they are still committed to enter the Federation on terms on which British India will have something to say. The Princes can meanwhile afford to wait, for other problems now arrest progress to the federal goal.¹⁰

Before we turn to the chief problem which blocks the way, a further word must be said on the position of the Indian States. It is one of the ironies of India that some of the few remaining autocracies of Asia still flourish there under the ægis of England. The Princes are a law unto themselves in domestic affairs, and only in cases of extreme misrule are they brought to book by the paramount power of the British Crown. But even the tolerance of democratic Britain cannot long forestall political change within their borders. Some of them know that if they refuse to march with the times they may imperil the very existence of their Order and they are preparing to make terms with the spirit of the age. Since the decision to enter an eventual Indian federation seems to open the door to domestic reform in their States, they halt on the threshold in doubt. They will be wise to dispel their own apprehensions, and to insure their own future, by timely reform.

The respite from immediate decision about

their place in the federation has been gained for the Princes by the failure of Hindu and Musulman in British India to compose their age-long quarrel. This feud has brought distress upon India many a time in the past : but never has it wrought such havoc in the political credit of her leaders as in 1932. The second session of the Round Table Conference bore witness to its intensity and revealed the weakness of Indian statesmanship. The two communities, with the prize of Indian self-government in their grasp, could not sink the differences which alone prevented them from taking it. They proclaimed to the world that sooner than make mutual and statesmanlike concessions they will cherish ancient feuds and confound new hopes. They now turn to England to save them from the consequences by imposing a settlement upon them. This is sheer political bankruptcy. No constitutional problem in history has ever been solved without great sacrifices by the parties engaged in making it. India can be no exception ; and to evade the task by appealing to the Prime Minister is to renounce the right to sovereignty.

It is idle to apportion blame where blame rests on both parties. We are only concerned with the result which leaves the decision of

Indian fate in the hands of the alien ruler. That the Nationalist movement will rest content under this self-inflicted humiliation is improbable, but there is little sign to-day that its leaders can find an early way of escape from it. There are, indeed, many in India who believe that the older generation must pass away before patriotism can overcome sectional discord ; and it is true that in the ranks of the youth, the intransigence of communal feeling is weakening. Meanwhile the only condition on which federal India can come into being is that Great Britain consent to impose a compromise upon Hindu, Musulman, Sikh, and Depressed Classes ; but, even if the English political genius for compromise were to make its supreme effort, an imposed settlement could have little inherent political virtue, and the result would not be stable. An enduring solution must be found by the Indians themselves. If it is not so found, the lesson of disunion will not be learned ; and, until it is, the hopes of India must wait a while for their consummation. But this delay is not necessarily lost time. If the lesson of disunion sinks into the mind of India, and there awakes a true conception of the responsibility of nationhood, it will serve a more

enduring purpose than any hasty solution designed to placate the impatience of the moment. A compromise imposed by England, even at the request of the disputants, cannot excise the canker of communal trouble ; for it is an external palliative applied to an internal disease. The cure, as said above, must come from within.

Now, it will not escape notice that India has here reached a critical point in a vicious circle. The association of the British and Indian peoples is now in transition from the benevolent autocracy of the British Raj to an eventual equal partnership in which India will exercise her rights under some system of autonomy. But, since in India something of the essential quality of a subject people still remains, described not long ago by Mr. Gandhi himself as a "slave mentality" : and since the Indian has long been accustomed to rely on the external power of Great Britain as his security, both domestic and foreign ; he unconsciously acts as if this safeguard against trouble will always operate, and therefore, in moments of decision, refuses to take the responsibility which he none the less claims as his right. Baldly stated, this means that the authority of England in India is the Indian's excuse for shirking the

responsibility of such a decision as now confronts him in the Hindu-Muslim feud. He still believes that England will stand between him and disaster : and as long as he cherishes this delusion he cannot even lay the foundation of his own ideal of self-government. At the same time, in his eyes, the presence of England in India stands in the way of his assumption of control ; whereas the fact is that England stands ready to give him control if he will only take it.

The result, at this moment (midsummer, 1932), is that political reform appears to be able neither to advance nor retreat. But progress has to be made, for the present transitional stage cannot endure long ; and since progress in India must be measured by the development of human capacity for responsibility, more than by the creation of political institutions, it is obvious and necessary that a big risk must be taken in providing the field for this development. Mere tutelage will not do it. The Reforms of 1919 blended tutelage with responsibility, the changes now being made will reduce the former and greatly extend the scope of the latter ; and it is a fair prediction that when they take shape in a new Constitution, many of those who now decry them will find that they offer

so much of the real substance of self-government as to be worthy of support. Once more, as in 1923, a large body of nationalists will probably desert the barren field of agitation and turn to constructive labour.

Thus the fourth decade of the twentieth century finds the relation of East and West in India in its most critical phase. The public mind is naturally concerned with the political aspect in which important problems are on the anvil ; and no small part of the future relation of India and Great Britain is at stake, both in the nature of the decisions made and in the manner in which they are executed. Nowhere in the British Commonwealth, hardly indeed anywhere in the civilised world, is the statesmanship of any of the politically mature Western nations faced with so severe a test of its merit as in India. So far the candid observer cannot say that it has failed ; and the proceedings of the Round Table Conferences in London will stand as evidence to all time, that in intention at least, and to a large extent in action also, the British people rose to the height of a difficult occasion. But since the test is not one of intention, but of the capacity of two partners to co-operate in solving a political problem of unusual magnitude, it would be

premature to say that either England or India can yet claim that they have succeeded in placing the political relations of East and West in their Indian aspect on a secure and lasting basis. What can be claimed is that they desire to do so and have made real progress in translating their desire into the realities of a constitution. The proof lies in the future.

This political aspect of the problem is but one facet of the whole. It lies in the forefront of the stage because it demands treatment here and now : but it is not the real heart of the matter. Those who have read the earlier pages of this chapter will see that the merely political view of India gives an inadequate picture and that beneath the active controversies of the moment, the forces of a greater contest are arrayed against each other. Not in the political field alone, but in the whole world of thought is the essential problem of East and West to be found. Indian thought, in its Hindu mould, is the real antithesis of the Western scientific spirit, and the fate of something much more vital than any political institution is now at stake in the unanswered question whether Hinduism, in the words already quoted, can look upon itself "with fresh eyes" and remould

its doctrine "to meet the needs of a more complex and more mobile social order." If this be not so, India may yet be plunged into a conflict, religious, social, and political, more acute than any struggle between British rule and Indian Nationalism : and perchance this strife is the price of her true emancipation.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

The Sword sang on the barren heath,
The Sickle in the fruitful field :
The Sword, he sang a song of death,
But could not make the Sickle yield.

BLAKE.

CHINA is a society of men belonging to this world, India a state of mind inspired by the other world. The contrast between these two great representatives of Asia runs through their whole conception of life ; it dictates their differing views of the destiny of mankind, their art, and their attitudes to the supernatural world. It places China nearer the West, and India apart from them both. In the Chinese mind, mankind is the centre of the universe, and China itself the Middle Kingdom in the realms of man. The visible world of nature is the theatre of his life, and the roots of his being are firmly set in the soil whose fruits he enjoys.

There are two deep influences in the historic life of China which reveal the importance of man and of nature : the worship

of ancestors and *Feng Shui*, the lore of wind and water. The former guarantees the continuity of mankind, the very character which depicts filial piety being that of a "son" supporting "old age"; the latter, in dictating the choice of the favourable site for a house, not only links the residence of the living with the graves of the dead, but attempts in the choice to harmonise human life with the local currents of the cosmic breath by studying the slopes of the hills and the flow of the streams. The first aim of the family is to find and to preserve the most auspicious environment for the homes of the living, the graves of the dead, and the ancestral temple which links the two. These are the thoughts of men who are essentially of the earth; and with a true insight into the inner spirit of Chinese life, a recent novelist gave her book the apt title of *The Good Earth*.¹

The art of China, which is one of the glories of mankind, draws its inspiration from the same source. It is natural, concrete, human; expressing the secular mind of its creators in a way which again marks the contrast with India, whose art is fantastic, symbolic, and almost inhuman. Chinese art holds the mirror up to nature and interprets life in

all its humour and tragedy, placing the figure of man prominently in a setting of visible reality and bidding him worship the beauty and grandeur of the world in which he lives. In porcelain, bronze, and poetry the Chinese artists for three thousand years have remained faithful to the tradition of humanity, and, if their achievements are one of the richest in our human heritage, they also remind us that the civilisation of China is one of the oldest in the world.

Chinese society, of which these arts were perhaps the highest expression, persisted through the ages in a more or less static form because it was founded on morality, possessed great cohesion, and was not threatened from without by any overwhelming force—at least not till late in history. The Chinese were an agricultural people anchored to the soil, the peasant owning what he tilled. They had few of the qualities of the nomad and none that were revolutionary except in times of economic stress when flood and famine drove them to revolt. The family system was their law, and the State ruled over them, by means of an oligarchy of intellect which took a complacent view of the demands of social discipline. Thus Empires rose and fell, new faiths flourished and

declined, invasion occasionally disturbed the even tenour of life, but through it all China retained her culture and her institutions intact. Her characteristic society, her language, her political organisation and her economic life have displayed at once a tenacity and a resistance to change which must be unique in history ; for, till the revolution of 1911, all these had maintained themselves in an unprogressive yet vital existence since the twentieth century before Christ.²

Such antiquity gives China a dignity of her own and helps to explain the intense national pride of the Chinese and their dogged resistance to innovation when it first appeared from the West. Rarely, indeed, during many centuries did the Chinese encounter other peoples who seemed to possess, or did, in fact, possess, such a heritage as theirs. The other great civilisations of the world were far out of sight, over the distant horizon of the desert ; and so the civilisation of China had not only the claim of great age, but it appeared in Chinese eyes to be almost without a rival in the world. Lying far from Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean, their long isolation probably accounts for the Chinese conception

of themselves as the central people of the earth beside whom the outer fringe of less fortunate races were barbarians of no account. Nature placed the barriers of mountain, desert and ocean between the Land of Sinim and the Western World, and behind them the Chinese lived in unprogressive complacency, unaware that on the other side of the world nations, more fertile in mind and greater in political power, were in the making. As late as the end of the eighteenth century the Emperor Chien Lung could say to George the Third's Ambassador that he commended the humble desire of the King of England to partake of the benefits of Chinese civilisation, and he continued in words worth quoting to-day, for they reveal the arrogance which prompted China at first to reject the advances of the West :

“ If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilisation, our ceremonies and our code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilisation, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. . . . Our Dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under Heaven, and kings of all

nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures."

In a mind so satisfied with itself there could be no motive for change. Since the Chinese system had survived the vicissitudes of forty centuries, descending to each generation with a new enrichment derived from the last, why should any son of Han seek to overthrow it and how could any alien civilisation claim to be its rival? The conditions which engender change and breed revolution were absent. Chinese society was homogeneous and democratic. Confucius and the Golden Mean in conduct forbade the resort to extremes; violence, war, and the military virtues were held to be low activities beneath the dignity of the "superior man"; and timely compromise was the highest political art. Economic forces which had overturned other civilisations did not exist, for the farming pursuits of the people had never been disturbed by new inventions or the rise of industry. Natural calamities were the fate of man; and if at times they could be interpreted as signs of the wrath of Heaven, the punishment was visited upon

the Son of Heaven, the Emperor, whose failure to placate the higher powers was paid for by deposition.

Here we light upon a curious and characteristic phenomenon. Rebellion against misrule was sanctioned by the will of Heaven: for when a people so patient as the Chinese was driven to revolt, its rulers must have sunk deep in incompetence or tyranny and be ripe for punishment. The first evidences of popular discontent were read as signs that the dynasty no longer enjoyed the complete favour of Heaven, and when discontent swelled to open rebellion the Mandate of Heaven was said to be exhausted and a new Son of Heaven had to be found to renew it. But it is an interesting fact that, though this right of rebellion was sanctioned and, so to speak, made constitutional, the Chinese stopped short of the next stage in the relations of the ruler and the ruled. Time and again did they depose an Emperor, but never did they impose on his successor those conditions of succession which might have been the foundation of genuine constitutional monarchy. They were content to hold the threat of abdication or execution over the Dragon Throne, and cared so little for politics that they never conceived the possi-

bility of compelling the Emperor to share some of the prerogatives and powers of government with the people.

Moreover, the freedom enjoyed by the eighteen provinces was so generous that autocracy might be said to have been tempered not only by abdication but by local autonomy of a very real kind. The Peking Government left the provinces to their own devices and required almost nothing of them but a regular flow of revenue ; and in order that burdens might be shared it yoked a poor province with a rich, and made one viceroy responsible for both. Even in lean years the post of viceroy or provincial governor was lucrative, and its incumbent paid largely for it to the Emperor or the Grand Secretary of State. During his tenure of office he must not only gather the revenue required by Peking, but must recoup himself, with heavy usury, for the price he had paid for it ; and he was often under the temptation to squeeze from the orange of public prosperity the juice of personal wealth. Custom permitted him to take a moderate share : it even applauded him if he could amass substantial wealth without provoking public feeling : and as long as his province was orderly, quiet, and productive, Peking

asked no questions. But if his squeeze became oppressive and taxation bore too heavily upon the people, they would revolt ; the noise of their outbreak would reach Peking, and either the viceroy would be dismissed for incompetence or he would be burned in his own Yamen by an infuriated populace. Such was the system of checks and balances which enabled provincial autonomy to work with a rough-and-ready efficiency ; and the proof of its merit is that it did so work. Within each province there were lesser units of local government in town and in country commune, each with a magistrate as the viceroy's representative for taxation and justice, and within each commune the inner final unit of the indivisible family. The Chinese society was socially and politically complete, at once autocratic in form and democratic in the essential spirit of the people. So composed it might have lasted for ever had not fate and the restless "Ocean Men" of the West decreed otherwise and broken the ancient seclusion of the Middle Kingdom with weapons against which the Chinese could offer no defence.

The character and weapons of the Western attack have already been described, and

little more need be said to complete the picture of the two combatants in the ensuing struggle. But light may be shed on both by comparing the Chinese defence with that of India. Politically there is a close resemblance between them. In both, an alien dynasty—Mogul in India, Manchu in China—had begun to fall into a decline when the new tide from the West first broke in real strength upon the shores of the East ; and though the Manchu Empire outlasted the Mogul by over fifty years, the roots of both had begun to wither long before their final collapse. Therefore the political defence of India and China alike was too weak to offer an effective resistance ; and we must look in other directions for the essential difference between the reactions of these two under Western influences. As we have seen, the Hindu mind was so formed as to possess a deep power of resistance, which was soon called into play after the first shock of the new impact : it was inherently hostile to the whole Western spirit. The Chinese, on the other hand, held a view of the universe which was not wholly divorced from the Western view, and all the Chinese needed to do was to adapt their essential philosophy to new circumstances. It might be said, there-

fore, that the signs in China pointed to a new evolution of indigenous thought, while in India the appearance of the West threatened a change so fundamental as to amount to a revolution.

Now China, though not so inherently and fundamentally different from Europe, was ill-prepared to undergo change. As we have seen, the motive for change had never played a decisive part in Chinese life ; there had, indeed, been periods of internal reform in some of the greater ages of China ; but in the last century of the Manchu Dynasty, the power to initiate reform had slipped from the hands of an already effete line of emperors ; and the signs of the times, as in the Taiping Rebellion, pointed to the early end of the dynasty itself.³ Once more the Mandate of Heaven was nearly exhausted, and the time was ripe for one of those many dynastic changes which have occurred at almost regular intervals since the dawn of Chinese history. But during this period of Manchu decline, a force hitherto unknown had arisen and it became evident towards the end of the nineteenth century that, when the Empire fell, a new claimant to power would dispute, with the old tradition of Imperial autocracy, the right to govern

China. The claimant was political democracy, brought from abroad by successive generations of young Chinese who, in seeking instruction in medicine, science, and economics overseas, had also imbibed the doctrines of the British, French, and American Revolutions.

The end of the Manchu Dynasty was, moreover, hastened by the policy of the European Powers in China. The advance of Russia to the Pacific Ocean, the growth of a new and powerful State in Japan, and the imperial expansion of England, France, and Germany, created what was known as the Far Eastern Question in which the supine and venal character of the Chinese Government was the central factor. Driven by Western pressure to permit the foreigner to trade in China, and unable or unwilling to give him the security of life and property which he demanded, the Manchu emperors at first sought to isolate and sterilise foreign infection by the system of extra-territoriality and by confining the foreign trader to the Treaty Ports on the coast. During this period, roughly from 1842 to 1894, the Powers were mainly concerned to establish the ordinary rights of international intercourse, and though the operation of extra-

territoriality was a thorn in Chinese flesh, China's sovereignty and territorial integrity remained intact. In 1894 a radical change came over the scene, due to the rise of Japan and the intensification of Imperialism in Europe ; and in the six years that followed, China was threatened with dismemberment.

It is a long and complicated story, and some of its interpreters have concluded that all the Powers were equally deep in wrongdoing. But the documentary evidence proves that the blame lies unequally ; that, of the five Powers most closely concerned, Russia was the most cynical and deliberate aggressor, with France as a willing accomplice supplying money to back Russian plans, and Belgium as a convenient screen on at least one critical occasion ; Germany now abetting Russia in her Far Eastern policy in order to divert her from Europe and now hesitating as to the most profitable course for her own *Weltpolitik* ; and Japan playing a rôle of increasing importance as the ultimate and determined enemy of Russia. America at first took an inconspicuous share, but when in 1899 the American Secretary of State, John Hay, adopted the traditional British policy of the Open Door and made it the keynote of American policy, she moved into

the front line of the Powers involved, and came to be regarded by the young Chinese as the most friendly of them all. Finally Great Britain emerged from this period with her long-standing policy of the integrity of China and the Open Door seriously modified by untoward circumstances, but also with a less blemished record than any of the European Powers.⁴

Meanwhile the revolutionary sentiment of Young China had grown, and the demand for internal reform had so increased that even at Court a policy of progress on modern lines gained favour and Imperial decrees were issued to meet the new sentiment. But the shrewder Chinese, among them Yuan Shih-kai, saw that rescripts of reform were not reform itself and that the movement offered no security against the chief peril in which China stood, namely, foreign aggression. The reform movement was short-lived, and in its place arose a new xenophobia which found in the Boxer Movement the instrument of its aggressive purpose. The international significance of the Boxer Rebellion was its anti-foreign character, while, internally it was a characteristic revolt against misgovernment. Looking at both these aspects, Sir Robert Hart described it prophetically as

"the prelude to a century of change and the keynote to the future history of the Far East." The Boxer challenge to the Powers might have led to the partition of China ; but in October, 1900, Great Britain and Germany concluded an agreement "not to make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions," to uphold the Open Door at the Treaty Ports, and to consult together on the steps to be taken if any other Power should try "to obtain in any form whatever such territorial advantages." This agreement offered China a genuine guarantee of territorial protection, though it did not prevent the levy of an excessive indemnity.

The Chinese reformers had thus before them an object lesson in the peril of their country. Misgovernment at home and the growing threat of foreign imperialism sharpened their resolve to make a new departure. They could hope for nothing from the dynasty either in the improvement of the condition of the people or in the defence of China. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen they created the revolutionary party, the Tung Men Hui, which was the forerunner of the present Nationalist Party, the Kuo

Min Tang, and their opportunity came in 1911. The Empire fell, and with it the whole frame of national government. The Revolutionaries captured the fortress of autocracy with an ease that surprised them, and found themselves heirs to the problem which the Manchu Dynasty had failed to solve. The Empire fell because it was ripe for dissolution, not because the new Republicans were either disciplined or ready for their self-imposed task. In a word, as had often happened in the long history of China, the Mandate of Heaven was exhausted; but those who had written the new Mandate in terms of popular sovereignty had little idea how to execute it.

There are many who believe that the resulting chaos has been but the modern repetition of those disorders which have always followed the fall of dynasties in China. History thus seemed to be repeating herself, and those who declare that there is nothing new in the pandemonium of to-day have some historical basis for their belief. None the less, the diagnosis is invalid because it fails to explain certain facts which are new. Hitherto a dynasty fell because it had exhausted the Mandate of Heaven, and a new Son of Heaven received his new

Mandate. To-day the belief in Heaven, in the Mandate and in the Sonship alike, has fallen into decay, and the new sanction from which a Chinese Government can derive its authority is still in embryo.

Now the novelty in all this is that three revolutions have occurred simultaneously. There is a Renaissance in China, comparable to the awakening of the European mind which is known by the same name ; there is an economic revolution like ours of a century ago ; and there is the political revolution which gave birth to the " Republic of China." The political revolution is the most evident and audible, because it has come to the surface of Chinese life more rapidly and disturbingly than the others, and has thus given the old problem of China's foreign relations a new urgency, besides creating huge problems in her domestic economy. This revolution is not in itself new, but derives its novelty from the character of the other two which accompany and influence it. There had been revolutions and fallen emperors before 1911, but Sun Yat-sen was the first Chinese rebel to hoist a republican flag ; and we must take this new Chinese flag as the symbol not merely of political change, but of a far-reaching revolution in

economics, in custom, in ethics, and in thought. The Chinese themselves speak of their twentieth-century Renaissance, in which the Old Learning is re-interpreted (where it is not actually in conflict with the New) as "The New Tide"; and wherever you go among Chinese not completely immersed in politics it is of this new flood of culture that you will hear.

In the New Tide the current of Western culture flows strong. The modern school of thought professes to find the chief cause of China's weakness in the traditional pacific philosophy and in the static condition of Chinese society. It rejects Confucius, not because his doctrine was either superstitious or historically inappropriate, but because it was essentially conservative: and since on their hypothesis there is so little to conserve, the great exponent of traditional wisdom is the natural object of the modern attack. Here we find the real heart of the Revolution; and to the fact that China thus seeks to change its mind we may point, as much as to boycotts, student processions, or labour unions, for proof that a new China is in being. The new China is superimposed on the old in such a way as to leave the latter still free to wield its pristine power on Chinese life

under the surface of modern change. This mingling of old and new is the characteristic feature of every great transition, whether it be in politics, religion, or culture ; and the conflict in the very soul of China to-day between tradition and reform reveals both the tenacity of ancient custom and the fierce, almost blind, resolve of Young China to find a new way of life.

The modern movement is a growth of many years. It began unseen a century ago when Europe appeared on the scene and set on foot a new process of thought, in Dr. Wilhelm's words "radically different from any that had gone before, which was destined to bring the history of Chinese civilisation, for the first time, closely into line with that of humanity as a whole." It broke into violent life in the Taiping Rebellion (1851-65) and in the Boxer Movement (1900) which both owed something to the new spirit of unrest conjured up by the subversive teaching of the West, though neither of them had any such constructive purpose as the Revolution of 1911. And it gained strength throughout the nineteenth century from the influence of missionary teaching and the powerful reinforcement of a rapidly growing phalanx of Chinese students educated abroad.

Thus the revolution in thought preceded political change. It took more than a century of contact with the West to prove to the Chinese that Europe was a force to be reckoned with, not only in material power, but in the world of thought ; and no small part of this revolution in the mind of China was due to the discovery that the Middle Kingdom was not the centre of the universe, that the Barbarians of the Outer Lands had a civilisation of their own greater in material power than, and as great in philosophical idea as, any in China. If we may generalise about the present Chinese situation, we may say that the novelty in this revolution, as compared with dynastic changes in the past, is its Western origin. Western influence has familiarised the educated Chinese mind with the idea of the State, in the political conception known to Europeans. Comparing the States of Europe with China, the modern Chinese found that the despised Barbarian had created an instrument of government which gave him power, while his own condition was that of a civilisation without power. It was no long step from this discovery to its logical consequence that, for China, a status of equality with the Powers of the world required the creation of

a Chinese State as the expression and the instrument of Chinese sovereignty. Having destroyed the loose fabric of the Chinese Empire, having resolved that there should be no restoration of that Empire, nor any monarchy in whatsoever form, the Chinese find themselves confronted with a problem in social and political reconstruction of uncommon magnitude.

The political and economic programme of the Revolution was drawn up by Sun Yat-sen, who prescribed the well-known Three Principles of the People as its doctrine and the equally well-known three periods of militarism, tutelage, and constitutionalism as the three stages in its growth to full stature.⁵ A premature attempt was made in 1912 to establish a parliamentary regime, but having no roots in the soil it withered away. When Yuan Shih-kai died in 1916 there were still many powerful heirs of the Imperial regime, especially in the North and Central China, who seized the opportunity of the Revolution to set up as provincial satraps; and for the next ten years the task of the revolutionaries was to subdue these war-lords one by one. This was the period defined by Sun Yat-sen as militarism: the Republic had to fight for its life against these

semi-feudal chiefs, and the fight is not yet over, nor can it end until the civil power displays greater authority and a greater determination to reform abuses than it has so far been able to do. Civil Government, as we know it, has never been in the saddle since 1911: indeed, it may truly be said that Sun Yat-sen's prevision of militarism has been only too fully realised and that the civil wars of the past twenty-one years have prevented China from making much progress in the period of tutelage. Yet the Kuo Min Tang is essentially a party with a civil, not a military, purpose. Its principal personalities are civilian politicians, with the striking exception of General Chang Kai-shek, the outstanding soldier of the Revolution, who has endeavoured to acquire the political habit of mind in the interval of his many civil wars. And since these civil wars have been "news," they have filled the pages of our Western press almost to the exclusion of the less sensational, though far more significant, story of party evolution and the growth of public opinion.

The theory of tutelage was derived from Sun Yat-sen's conviction that the Chinese people were not ready to undertake the responsibilities of any form of representative

government, and was therefore based on fact. It entrusted to the Party—the Kuo Min Tang—the sovereign powers of government, and imposed upon its leaders the two-fold task of administering the country and of preparing the people for the exercise of their political rights.⁶ The progress made in both directions has been greater than appears on the surface, but the constant pre-occupation with warfare against semi-independent war-lords, especially in the north, has diverted the energies of the National Government in Nanking from the task of reconstruction, and has prevented it from exercising any comprehensive national authority. Moreover, another conflict was in progress behind the scenes. Within the Party itself there have been at least two schools, those who with characteristic Chinese inertia believed that old methods could solve new problems, and others who knew that the task of modern China required greater popular discipline and a more highly organised State than had ever existed before. Between them controversy rages continuously, not only over the principle involved, but at every turn of practical policy; so that the working day in Nanking is filled with discussion not only of “What shall we do?” but also “Whether

it matters much how we do it." And when there is added to the major concerns of civil war and of internal controversy the inevitable struggle for power between different factions and personal groups within the Party, we can see how the human factor complicates a revolutionary problem which is itself already complicated and vast beyond conception.

Another factor arose out of the almost sacrosanct nature of Sun Yat-sen's political legacy. There was a powerful group in the Kuo Min Tang who held that the Party, and the Party alone, had the right to determine policy. Dr. Sun had bequeathed to the members of the Party a sacred duty and, in the minds of some, an inalienable right to govern, which has led to the much-criticised dictatorship of the Party. In this right and this duty, those Chinese who did not openly accept the principles of the Party itself, were given no part; and thus there grew up within the Kuo Min Tang a vested right in government. Enjoying the exercise of power (though it was, in fact, often mere authority without real power) the orthodox interpreters of Sun's legacy made the period of tutelage, which was essentially a transitional form, an end in

itself ; and by rejecting the co-operation of all non-party forces in the problems, or government, they gradually made the whole foundation of the Party too narrow for the task it had to perform. In a word, for lack of new life drawn from without, the Kuo Min Tang three years ago had lost its original vitality and no longer possessed the power within itself to offer the nation a genuine civil alternative to militarism. Fortunately, there was always in Nanking a number of statesmen who realised the essential weakness of this position ; and the Plenary meetings of the Party in the past four years have shown that they had substantial backing. These men saw that the irresponsible tyranny of the party-branches throughout the country had alienated the popular sympathy which the Kuo Min Tang had enjoyed in earlier years, and they sought to give the Party a renewal of strength by broadening the basis of its authority. But such was the state of disunion in Nanking itself, and so powerful were the forces of personal jealousy, that the reformers of this school, though they have held some of the highest positions in Nanking, was able to achieve but little. When the crisis with Japan broke out in 1931, the National Government was reduced to so

narrow a foundation that it had lost much of its earlier representative quality, and had only survived by the remarkable tenacity of one or two men. What the result of the crisis will be in Chinese politics may be left to the future to show, but it may be hoped that the lesson on the value of unity will not be lost. Meanwhile, opinion is mobile, and in the uncertainty of to-day any solution is possible. It may be found in the Soviet, or in Fascism, or in a representative form of democracy; but, whatever the form, the spirit will still be Chinese.

The confused tale of civil war and party feud cannot be told here. We must go behind these ephemeral events to find out whither China is going. And our first conclusion will be that the destination of the modern movement is still unknown, and the final choice of the political constitution still unmade. All is still fluid, yet amenable to sound influence. The first experiment in representative institutions failed sixteen years ago; it was followed by a period of preparation in which Sun Yat-sen evolved his programme of three stages, and even after the publication of his plan there was no general agreement regarding the type of constitution most suited to China. When

he died in 1925 the Nationalist Party was already in open alliance with Russia, and forces were at work behind the scenes making for the eventual adoption of a Soviet system. But it is now clear that Borodin, even in the heyday of Russian influence in Canton (1925), was beset by doubts about the appropriateness of the Soviet form and, perhaps, even deeper doubts of the Chinese capacity to establish it. And when the Kuo Min Tang broke with Russia in 1927 the tide set in a different direction and is still flowing.⁷

Of the future part which Russia may play in the Far East something will be said in the final chapter. The Kuo Min Tang owed much to Russia during the years 1923-27, not only in arms and propaganda, but in lessons of political discipline and organisation. Borodin and his fellow-Russians supplied an element in the movement which was lacking ; and their presence in Canton revealed the fact that the Chinese were not so fundamentally anti-foreign as to refuse all aid from abroad. When China turned against Russia, the moment seemed like a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, might lead on to fortune for the liberal nations of the West.⁸ The expulsion

of the Bolsheviks left a vacant place for some one to enter. The Chinese were aware of their need of help ; and as the breach with Russia coincided with a pronounced reaffirmation of the Far Eastern policy adopted by America and Great Britain at the Washington Conference, it was obvious that, with but a little encouragement, the Chinese would turn to the Anglo-Saxon world for the assistance which they required. There were difficulties to overcome : for the Chinese regarded the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, as the imperialist authors of their troubles in foreign affairs ; and it was a matter of candid and sympathetic contact to convince them that the professions of Washington and of the British Memorandum of 1926 were sincere. The difficulty was surmounted, and an era of new relations set in. Not only did this mean that the problem of extra-territoriality, with its allied questions of the foreign concessions and settlements, was transferred to an atmosphere in which negotiation could take the place of embittered conflict, but it opened the gate of opportunity to a much wider field.

China to-day possesses the potential capacities of the modern state, but lacks the means to develop them. She needs a political

constitution which will give her society its true stability ; she needs, further, a wide extension of education, the development of her natural resources and the improvement of her means of communication. Behind and beneath all these lies the need for an alert and instructed public opinion to audit the results of Chinese statecraft ; and in the very forefront is the need of capital for all these developments. In her urgent need she has turned to the Western Powers and to the League of Nations, and has found them not unwilling to co-operate. The obstacle to full co-operation is the general lack of confidence which retards progress in China itself and makes the foreign investor cautious in approaching Chinese loans. In the final chapter of this book the reader will find a further analysis of the situation designed to show that lack of confidence is partly due to Chinese disregard of some of the nation's manifest obligations, both financial and political. But since any analysis of her condition leads back to her political instability, it is clear that those who wish to co-operate with her must turn their first attention to her fundamental problems of government.⁹

In this field the Chinese have shown a

great disposition to welcome foreign aid. Many regard the present constitution as purely provisional, and anxiously peer into the future to see the next step on the way to their goal. None of them believes that representative government is yet in sight : but the more far-seeing among them realise the critical condition of their country which has been brought home to them by recent events at home and in Manchuria, and demand some reform in the direction of a better representation of the popular will. Indeed, they attribute the decline of public interest in politics to the dictatorship of the Party against which violent protest is at times directed. They hope that, through a new association between the Party and the people, there may be a revival of the spirit that gave birth to the Revolution. To-day the pulse of the movement is low because the spirit that fired its early days has begun to falter, and the people are weary. They pray that the day of battle and tumult will pass, and they hope that the day of liberty and discipline is about to dawn. They wish to be led ; and they need moral leadership above all things. It was not Dr. Sun's policy which made the heart of the revolution beat high in the early days : it was his

personality and his devotion to the cause. China in her present hour of trial and of hope anxiously awaits a new message from her leaders, a message from men of vision who can summon the people to work out their own salvation.

One line of reform is marked by the institutions which China has inherited from her own past and which, in their various spheres, have served her well. It is necessary to broaden the basis of her Government and to create an organ of the genuine representation of interests and classes now excluded from participation in the whole political task. Whether this organ should be created anew, or whether it can be found, say, in the existing Legislative Council, is a matter for considered choice ; but its membership should be drawn from such existing bodies as the guilds which represent both functional and territorial interests, and from universities, labour unions, and other institutions. In such a representative body, based, of course, on the principle of indirect election, there would be the nucleus of public opinion, a nerve centre of public interest which the Republic has so far lacked : and though, at first, it might be a difficult body to manage, it would have a stability and a chance of

permanence which the first parliaments of the Revolution never possessed. Moreover, it would bring the government into contact with public opinion ; and it would be in the direct line of progress from Dr. Sun's period of tutelage to true constitutionalism.

This is but one illustration chosen at random of the many requirements of political reform in Nanking ; and only a treatise of many chapters could describe them all, for they are to be found in every function of government. Similarly, it would take a survey of the whole of China to reveal her social and economic needs or to show the progress already made in laying the foundations of the new order. The Mass Education movement, the Nankai University at Tientsin, the Commercial Press in Shanghai, afford striking evidence, again chosen at random, of the constructive work undertaken by Chinese on their own initiative, and the Peking Union Medical College is perhaps the happiest instance of the co-operative enterprise of East and West. In the economic sphere, as in the region of public health, the programme of Chinese nationalism is under way, though the beginnings are small ; and, at its very outset, the leaders of the Party sought guidance from abroad. There

is no more hopeful sign in the Far East than the manner in which the Chinese Government has welcomed the expert assistance of the League of Nations; and the missions sent from the Economic, Health, and Transit Sections of the Secretariat in Geneva have laid the foundations of a most fruitful co-operation, proving to many sceptical Chinese the value of the League in the regeneration of their country. Their examination of the problem has proved that the Revolution must now define its objective in strict relation to its resources. Even if this should mean that much of the ambitious programme of social economic and political reform must be set aside to await better times, it is a vital and necessary decision which if executed with determination will lay the required foundations of stability and inspire new confidence at home and abroad.

The relations of East and West in China have thus reached a stage in which the problems of past times appear in a new light. It is a moment of great opportunity. After a period of intense strife in which Russia sought to use China as the eastern wing of a world-revolution, the Chinese have turned to the Western world in search of light. Some would seek the new discipline which

China needs by following Fascist Italy, but the majority are inclined to believe that an evolution more in keeping with their national character can be found in the political example of the British Commonwealth and the United States than in the ideals of Soviet Russia. They expect and hope that our co-operation will be given in a spirit which appreciates their difficulties, and they do not really grudge our insistence on existing rights. Provided we approach the whole problem with the avowed intention of placing the immense resources of Western political experience at their disposal, they will show an accommodating temper in their treatment of the unsolved controversies between us. They are satisfied that we are pledged in principle to a conciliatory policy, that we have taken pains to see the Chinese problem in its true light, and that we share with them their hopes of a great China.

We, on our part, have a great responsibility. England is the home of political liberty; and the achievements of a long line of our statesmen have proved that government for the people, by the people, of the people, is not only a dream but a great political reality. Our ideals have taken wing overseas, have alighted on the Chinese mind, and have there

awakened the hope that one day China will create a true commonwealth of liberty for her people. The promise of that perhaps distant day is heavily beclouded by human error and by difficulties inherent in the vast revolutionary task ; but the whole scene surveyed in a true perspective is not discouraging. Its perplexity demands constancy, courage, and discernment ; and when the people of China appeal to us to aid them in their attempt to follow our example, we have a peculiar duty to respond to their call. Only a few years ago China was a sea lashed by the hurricane of revolution ; but even then the firm rock was being formed, slowly, like a coral reef, and the prophetic eye could see that one day it would rise above the surging tide to make a secure foundation for the homes of men. To-day the rock is above the surface, and the far-sighted Chinese may claim that, despite all the evils of strife, upon it is set a beacon of promise.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN: THE JANUS OF ASIA

. . . in the island of Zipangu, their idols are fashioned in a variety of shapes . . . some exhibit the appearance of a single head with two countenances. . . .

MARCO POLO.

JAPAN is a green Pacific island with three attendant isles closely attached to it. Neither tropical nor temperate, but partaking of both: neither luxuriant like southern Asia, nor reluctant in vegetation like the colder north: it stretches from the latitude of Egypt to that of France, surrounded by the ocean which keeps it cool, yet receiving from the south those wet and warming winds that make it fertile and sometimes oppressive. It is the home of quiet beauty, a landscape of delicate appeal. Even the sharp and serried masses of volcanic mountains have little of the grandiose and terrible effect on man which the massive ranges of Central Asia exercises upon him. Fujiyama itself, serene, lofty, sublime, is as it were a heavenly summit set in an earthly frame, but still in a frame. And the characteristic note of the

whole country is that of order, taste and delicacy.

Despite the devastating imitation of the bad as well as the good in Western things, despite the ravages of industrialism which are fortunately confined to the highly developed coastal belt, beauty still remains. Doubtless the proletariat of Osaka, nearly three million strong, lives in almost complete divorce from the tasteful environment so typical of Japanese life, but even they have only to take an electric tramway to Nara, fifty minutes away, to find themselves in one of the historic places of Japan which has lost none of its matchless appeal to the eye and to the mind. The colours and forms which are enshrined for ever in the pictures of the great artists are still to be seen in the Japanese countryside where taste still pervades life. And though we may suspect that the creative spirit which enabled Japan to re-fashion the models she borrowed from China is dying, we can but rejoice that its best achievements appear to be immortal.¹

There is a Japanese poem which tells of a pilgrim in spring who walked along the Tokaido road sounding his bell until he came to a tree in full blossom, and there he stood still, refusing to strike the bell lest the

vibrations of sound should shake even one petal from its branches. The poet's brief verses reveal the innate love of beauty and the worship of flowers in a form appropriate to the Japanese spirit; and in the pictorial art of Japan, as well as in her literature, this delicate touch is used in methods of suggestion and understatement which could only be the heritage of a people long accustomed to highly cultivated forms of expression. In human relations the gracious courtesy of the people is universal, and shows, as in their art, that they are the children of a cultured parentage during whose centuries a civilised society of exquisite attainments has slowly ripened to perfection. Already in the tenth century of our era the grace of Japanese manners was one of the notable features of their state of society; and in the *Pillow Book* of Sei Shōnagon, as in Lady Murasaki's *Tale of Genji*, the twentieth century may find a mirror of behaviour which reflects a social picture of almost sophisticated maturity.²

Not only in politeness is this essential restraint of Japan to be seen. It pervades the life and thought of the people and gives their culture that touch of the Hellenic spirit which caused one observer to call Japan

"Greece without the intellect." The description is so apt that, on repeating it, the distinguished Japanese scholar who first drew my attention to it, rolled it round his tongue as if to draw from it the full savour of the compliment. For compliment it is : and if a criticism be implied in the suggestion that Japan lacks "the critical and constructive power of mind which has made the Greeks, after two thousand years, still the living masters of the West," it is none the less a judgment inspired by genuine appreciation.³ If the Japanese had possessed that power, in addition to their historic qualities, they would have been the most original race in Asia ; but, lacking it, they took their language and much of their inspiration in art and letters from China ; and in more recent times imitated Europe in the art of government. But to adjudge them as merely imitative is to miss one of their most essential qualities ; for where they have copied the models of other nations they have usually adapted, assimilated, and transformed these originals into something truly their own.

In the life of action the Japanese are moved by loyalty and a deep sense of honour. Throughout their history they have lived under the social discipline of their clans, and

within the clan was the family holding its members in bonds of filial piety only less strong than those of the Chinese. They were quick to act, passionate, and bold, finding in the dangers of battle and tumult a fitting outlet for their restless spirit. Thus they developed the qualities of personal loyalty, courage, and honour which gave them an active devotion to a common ideal which the Chinese never displayed. Unlike the Hindu, again, they found in nature around them a world of reality and in their relations with their fellow-men a source of enjoyment and a challenge to endeavour. Being rarely during many centuries summoned to defend their country against an alien invader, their allegiance was based less on a sense of nationality than on the local patriotism of their clan ; and to this very day the clan spirit is still alive. But the idea of the unified state under one Emperor was universally upheld, and it was the essential political duty of all Japanese to maintain the authority of the ruling house. In the person of the Emperor the national life of Japan was incarnated, and the religious veneration of the Throne is probably derived as much from its unbroken antiquity as from any genuine belief in its supernatural origin.⁴

Now there is much in the history of Japan that reads like the story of Europe. Mediæval Japan was a picturesque stage on which kings, barons, and unruly abbots played a part closely resembling the feudal drama of our continent. A Japanese emperor, eight centuries ago, declared that there were three things he could not control, "the fall of the dice, the river Kamo in spate, and the turbulent monks of Mount Hiei"; and in his words we can hear an echo of the Holy Roman Empire itself. European feudalism found its counterpart in the Japanese *Hôken* of which Dr. Nitobe says that "they were so alike in their process of development and in their general character that they may be identified as the same politico-economic stage in the social evolution of mankind." And the feudal system in Japan placed its impress on the national mind so clearly that it is the essential qualities of the feudal chieftain that we associate with the Japanese to this day. Under the rule of a military caste the virtues of chivalry were fostered. "Japanese feudalism," says an English observer already quoted above, "converted the Buddha's doctrine of renunciation into the stoicism of the warrior. The Japanese Samurai renounced desire,

not that he might enter Nirvana, but that he might acquire the contempt of life which would make him the perfect warrior. In him the knight included and swallowed up the saint. And the Samurai, meditating in a teahouse on the beauty, the brevity, and the pathos of life, and passing out to kill or to die, is as typical of the Japanese attitude to life as the wandering Sannyasin is of the Indian." ⁵

Such was the people for whom the gate of intercourse with the West was opened in the sixteenth century. Through it Europe brought novelties of many kinds: new types of ship which to the seafarers of Japan were objects of special interest, firearms which they seized with all the zest of born fighters, and the Bible which made hosts of converts in thirty years. To receive them all Japan opened her doors wide, but closed them again in the spirit of *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*. When it was reported to the Tokugawa Shogun, in 1637, that a Spaniard in his cups had boasted that Spain had grown great because she first sent her missionaries to corrupt the minds of foreign peoples and then sent her armies to conquer them, Christianity was forbidden; and, although the decree was not fully executed, we may

take it as the first ripple of the anti-foreign tide which, during the next two centuries, rose and fell in waves of popular feeling. None the less, the Japanese are not an intolerant people ; and although they were sedulously taught to regard Christianity as "the evil faith," the motive which prompted the exclusion of Christianity was political. The Shogun Iyeyasu forbade Christian Missions because the foreign ships which bore the Bible to Japan also carried arms, and landed them on the island of Kyushu, which was the home of his rivals. By making it appear that the Christian Powers were a danger to Japan, he could rally support to his princely house against its domestic foes. Thus, artificially, he planted a seed of xenophobia in Japan, which two centuries later grew to be an obstacle of no small dimensions across the path of the modernisation of the country.⁶

Over these two centuries we must pass in one stride. In them Western influence grew on the same scale and by the same methods as have been described in India and in China ; but in Japan it awakened a very different response. The Japanese being made aware of the power of the West, determined to explore its source ; and with such

success did they harness their powers of adaptation to the task that they accomplished the miracle of a national transformation in the space of a short life-time. In 1860 Japan was feudal, unprogressive, remote from the moving world : by 1900 she was modern in every sense, awake to the benefits if blind to the evils of Western civilisation, and ready to prove her mettle in a contest with one of the Great Powers. The triumph of regeneration was the work of the Elder Statesmen, one of the most remarkable groups of men that Asia has ever produced. They nursed its industries, created its army and navy, guided its policy of expansion, and could claim after thirty years that the Japan of their designs in 1867 was the Japan of victorious reality when Russia had to accept defeat at her hands in 1905. Rarely has achievement so faithfully reflected its originating conception.

The so-called revolution in Japan was really a restoration of the imperial power accomplished by the overthrow of the Tokogawa Shogunate which had exercised an unchallenged regency for three hundred years. It was accompanied by a determined effort to modernise Japanese life not only in government, but in the army, the navy,

and in industry ; and it took place at a moment when Europe was undergoing a far-reaching change owing to the rise of Germany. Thus, when Japan began to look westwards, the most conspicuous phenomenon on her new horizon was the figure of Prussia rapidly mounting to a new seat of power in Europe and aggrandized by three swift victories over Denmark, Austria, and France. What Prussia had achieved, Japan could also accomplish. There was no mystery in the springs of German power, and under resolute guidance Japan resolved to draw new strength from the same source. Hence her decision to rely on military power as the foundation of the new structure and to design the constitution of her new state on the Imperial German model which, while providing the outward forms of representative government, reserved real power to the Crown and its self-chosen advisors. The Japanese Diet, like the Reichstag of Imperial Germany, was (and to some extent still is) merely a necessary concession to nineteenth-century parliamentarism, and wielded little of the sovereign power of Parliament. The Reichstag, said Karl Liebknecht, was but "a figleaf to cover the naked absolutism of the Hohenzollern Crown" ; and the Diet

in Tokyo was hardly more. German influence in the making of modern Japan set its mark upon her development in ways of which we have not yet seen the end.⁷

Now the rapid economic growth of Japan brought into being new classes of society, unknown or disregarded before, who created power for themselves in developing commerce, industry, shipping, and banking. For them there was no place in the original design of the sacred hierarchy of government, and they grew restive at their exclusion from authority. Moreover, they often judged the policy of the noble clansmen—soldiers, sailors, and statesmen—to whom the revolution had given political control, as ill-suited to promote the real economic interests of the nation. And they began to make themselves heard in the secret places of counsel near the Throne. Their influence, at first negligible, gradually grew; and in proportion as the Elder Statesmen appreciated the part which increasing national wealth could play in sustaining the whole power of Japan, this commercial opinion gained new strength. But it was still a beggar at the door for many years until the change of the world after the War gave Japan reason to reconsider her position among

the nations. It is a significant fact that the first Prime Minister in Japan who did not belong to the original feudal aristocracy only came into power as late as 1919.

Between 1914 and 1920 the landmarks by which Japan had set her new course in the nineteenth century were wiped out, and strange signs had taken their place. Imperial Germany, the shining exemplar whose triumphs in Europe Japan hoped to repeat in Asia, fell; and, in falling, shook Japanese faith in the military and police state to its very foundations. And before Germany, Russia! There another throne was overwhelmed by the dark and massive power of a proletariat unloosed; and from the gulf of chaos strange and invisible forces emerged to foment dangerous thoughts in other lands. And when, at the creation of the League of Nations, the old diplomacy was apparently dethroned in Paris—ironical place of execution indeed for such a victim—the Japanese oligarchs paused to take their bearings in the new conditions. Their perplexity was sharpened by the fact that the people of Japan, enticed by Hollywood and Karl Marx, showed signs of straying from their appointed loyalty to the Crown, and had begun to think those “dangerous thoughts”

which had overturned the dynasties of Europe. Whither should they turn?

While the question was still unanswered, the British Government brought the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to an end; and thus the slate was wiped clean of almost all the factors which had made up the sum of Japanese policy. In the long controversy which ensued in Japan over the choice of a new course, the advocates of a pacific method, supported by the great body of commercial opinion, gained at first the upper hand, and successive Japanese cabinets accepted the new obligations of collective responsibility under the League. Japanese policy in China was, on the whole, conciliatory; and, in Japan itself, the growth of the parliamentary and civil power pointed to political development along English rather than Prussian lines. But the power of the oligarchy, allied to the military party, was still entrenched in the Privy Council; and though the more experienced Elder Statesmen had disappeared by death, the system which they had created still stood fundamentally unchanged.

Thus there exists in Japan a dual control. The civil power, established none too firmly in the elected House and the Cabinet, and seriously weakened by parliamentary cor-

ruption, has to fight for its rights, and to use as skilfully as possible a Constitution deliberately designed to limit its action. The military party, on the other hand, has great constitutional authority, and the Ministers in charge of the fighting services, always generals and admirals, have direct access to the Throne, which they frequently use to circumvent the policy of the Cabinet to which they belong. There is no Cabinet responsibility, and policy takes an uncertain course. At times, moderation and pacific intent are uppermost ; at other times, the "forward party" resumes its sway ; and when events disappoint the hopes of the former, the latter take charge. During 1931, for instance, circumstances seemed to open the way for strong action, and the situation in Manchuria particularly appeared to prove that no cure could be found for its evils in a policy of conciliation.

The military party believe that an aggressive policy in continental Asia is vital to Japan's existence, and their belief has two aspects, political and economic, of which we take the latter first. For many years after the war of 1905 they found great support among the commercial classes, who were acutely aware of the growing economic pressure in

domestic affairs and sought to relieve it by expansion abroad. If that pressure was felt then, it is to-day a serious danger. There is profound economic distress in Japan. Neither in her rural economy nor in the industrial world is the foundation of life secure. The base is unstable because it is too narrow. Two staples, silk and cotton : two countries, America and China : these are the hinges on which her trade revolves, and we shall see in a moment the extent of her dependence on them. For the moment it is sufficient, nay, essential, to note that this instability creates two problems in the statesman's mind. He sees the structure of Japanese achievements rising ever higher on a slender foundation, and strenuously endeavours to relieve the increasing stress upon it by widening the area of foreign markets and by creating new industrial enterprises at home.

This *economic* need would be difficult to satisfy in normal times ; but it is made more formidable by the world-wide depression, by the rising barriers of national tariffs abroad, and by political conditions in China which hamper trade. And it creates a *social* problem of the first magnitude in the condition of the people. The pressure of

increasing numbers is being felt in Japan at a moment when the whole national tradition, in the public and private lives of the people, is being attacked by subversive forces from without. Economic discontent is a fertile soil for communism, and it is significant that the political writings which are most widely read in the upper classes of the proletariat and in the hard-pressed middle classes are not those of the English prophets of political liberty, but the German and Russian heralds of revolution. Hence arise those "dangerous thoughts" which move the hitherto disciplined people of Japan to dream of change. And when they arise, the ruling classes seek the time-honoured means of diverting the populace from them by the distraction of some foreign adventure. How far this search for diversion played a part in the crisis of 1931-32 it is not possible to say, but it is a factor in the situation which cannot be ignored.

The Japanese problem is one in which population, markets, and sources of supply are linked together in such a way as to make it not only a domestic issue of deep concern, but also an international question. The net annual increase of the population in Japan proper is roughly three-quarters of a

million, and it shows as yet little sign of slackening. The increase cannot be absorbed by farming reform on existing cultivated land, for it has been proved that the introduction of more scientific methods of agricultural production would diminish the number of workers per acre ; the present state of the rice culture, for instance, is uneconomic. Nor does the colonization of undeveloped land in the north offer more than a mild relief of the total pressure. Birth control is officially discouraged, and though it is practised on a much wider scale than is commonly supposed, it will be some years before it checks the increase of the masses. Emigration has brought so little alleviation that it plays no major part in the problem ; and therefore Japan is driven back on an ever more intensive industrialism at home.¹³

It was said above that Japanese industry and commerce revolve largely round the staples of silk and cotton. This statement needs elaboration and qualification. Japan buys abroad coal, oil, iron, raw cotton, rice, wheat, beans, and numerous less important products ; and sells silk and cotton goods to pay for them, a certain balance of payments coming from shipping services, etc. In the

total transaction the United States of America and China (both as buyers and sellers) are responsible for over 60 per cent. of the whole. On the export side of the account, America took, in 1928, £82,000,000 out of a total of £197,000,000, and China £37,000,000. India took £14,000,000, and Manchuria came fourth with the comparatively low figure of £11,000,000. Thus as a market for Japanese goods America is worth over seven times as much as Manchuria, and China proper over three times. And as sources of supply, the order in which these foreign countries stand is much the same. America again heads the list, the order being : (1) America, (2) India, (3) China, (4) Great Britain, (5) Manchuria. These figures throw some light on the Japanese belief that Manchuria plays a vital part in her economy. We may pursue the point a little further. Taking those articles which are vital to Japanese needs in her present stage, we find that Manchuria supplies two-thirds of her imported coal, one-third of her pig-iron, no iron ore, and practically the whole of her supply of beans, bean-cake, bean-oil, etc. Ninety per cent. of her wool comes from Australia, the great bulk of her raw cotton from India and America, the whole of her

sugar from Java, one-half of her imported pig-iron from India, the whole of her imported iron ore from India and Malaya, 95 per cent. of her wheat from North America, and the bulk of her increasing import of rice from Indo-China, Burma, and Siam.⁸

Thus Japan is vitally dependent on foreign sources for her needs; but the facts now quoted from her own official returns do not give Manchuria that claim to a special place in the economy of Japanese life which has been made for it. Even when the total volume of Japanese investments in that country is added to the account (about £214,000,000) the economic importance of Manchuria to Japan must be set down in moderate terms. In coal and in pig-iron the claim is considerable; in beans it is also important; but in no other strictly economic aspect is Manchuria vital. Japan, doubtless, looks to the future and foreseeing a hundred-fold growth of the Manchurian market, hopes to secure the lion's share for herself: but even that can never be so important in her economic life as the commercial good-will of America and China; and therefore to pre-empt Manchuria by means which disturb her best customers abroad is a short-sighted policy, only too characteristic of a military

caste. The political and strategic reasons for her Manchurian policy are, in fact, the true motive and they throw light upon Japan's claim which cannot be found in any economic reading of the situation.

Japan fought the war of 1904 to prevent the mainland of the North China coast, including Korea, from falling into Russian hands. If she had allowed Russia to proceed with her penetration of north-east China, she would have been confronted with the danger of Russian control of the whole continental littoral from Vladivostok to Dairen. Manchuria at that time became vital to Japan for political and strategic reasons; and, in view of the weakness of China, which still persists, these reasons still operate. Can any European, with the history of his own continent in mind, or indeed any American, remembering the Monroe doctrine and the Mexican Wars, deny their validity. An enigmatic Russia on the one hand, a disordered China on the other, and the prize of Manchuria lying between! The situation seems to demand a controlling hand; and, in her existing interests, of which the South Manchurian Railway is the chief, Japan claims a stake in the country based on treaty right. This is a

factor in the problem which neither China, nor some liberal opinion abroad, fully appreciates. To ignore it is to shut the eye to realities ; and therefore it must be borne in mind by those who hope to make any contribution to the problem.

We have seen that "relief from pressure at home by expansion abroad" is the slogan of modern Japan. But in the voices that repeat it we can hear a note of discord. Japan here exhibits "the single head with the two countenances" of Marco Polo's description. The military party interprets expansion abroad as the acquisition of territory and the control of continental Asia on the shores of the Pacific ; the other party believes that this policy may endanger more valuable markets elsewhere and conceives of expansion in terms of trade with all nations, not in terms of political control of China. Korea is the object lesson to the world of Japanese expansion in the militarist's sense ; for the annexation of Korea practically closed the door of trade to foreign nations by including the country within the high wall of the Japanese tariff, and finally severed the political connection of Korea with China. The Manchurian case of to-day is not identical with the history of Korea from 1895

onwards, but the similarities are so striking that when Japanese policy appears to follow in Manchuria a line parallel to that which led to the annexation of Korea in 1910, we may well ask whether the intention is, or is not, to pursue it to the same end in Manchuria. Japanese statesmen of the school of Shidehara and Inouye will answer with an emphatic negative ; and we would accept their denial without reserve were it not for the fact that the opposing school of thought is still powerful. Here again we see Japan in two minds. Who can interpret the outcome of her inner conflict ?

Passing from this speculation we must make an attempt to assess, judicially, the respective claims of China and Japan. No Japanese authority has ever denied the sovereign claim of China in Manchuria ; and the Powers have acknowledged it in repeated public declarations. Manchuria, since 1644, has been definitely Chinese territory, not merely a "dependency" as two of the most recent writers on the subject misleadingly call it.⁹ In international law, in geography and in race, Manchuria is Chinese ; and the recent migrations of Chinese from within the Great Wall have put the present and future character of the population beyond

dispute.¹⁰ That fact is the bedrock of certainty in much that is uncertain ; and no reading of the economic interest, strategy, or high policy of any other nation can impair the fundamental national right of China which here rests on a foundation of moral justice. But no careful observer can deny, and the Chinese themselves must admit, that the substance of Japanese rights in Manchuria also rests on a basis of international law which will have to be recognised in any future settlement. The Chinese find to-day that, owing to the venality, weakness, and shortsightedness of their past rulers, their effective possession of this great territorial asset is prejudiced by agreements and treaties which, in 1905 and 1915, placed Japan in a position of special privilege. The crisis of 1931 arose out of the methods adopted by China—or by certain Chinese authorities in Manchuria—to evade the consequences of the past and to restrict Japan in her enjoyment of the economic opportunities thus given.

The story of the crisis, and of the treaties and engagements which lie behind it, has been told elsewhere and will not be repeated here. The conflicting claims of China and Japan are essentially capable of reconciliation

by political means, though the two parties may need the services of a firm and honest broker to guide them to a settlement. We have seen that it is possible for the Japanese Government to hold within itself conflicting views of its own policy ; and on the Chinese side there is an even greater lack of essential unity. To Japan must be assigned the responsibility for handling a difficult situation with impetuosity and thus spreading a local conflict far beyond its original scene, and to China the fundamental cause of the trouble. The real reason why the Manchurian railway controversy set the Far East ablaze was not because the problem was insoluble, but because one of the parties to the dispute possessed no real sovereign government and the other was for the moment guided by headstrong men who used violence and called it firmness. The immediate blame must rest on the latter ; but, since the trouble originally springs from disorder in China, the crisis will have broken in vain unless the Chinese realise that neither their own national existence, nor the general peace, nor any other interest in the Far East can be secure, until they put their house in order and establish a government with real authority over them.

Now, apart from the rights and wrongs of the case, a graver issue was raised by Japan's reported refusal to admit the League as an arbiter in it. This refusal seemed to deny the validity of the whole system of collective conciliation set up by the Covenant. It is true that the treaties of 1905 and 1915, on which Japan takes her stand, directly concern China and Japan alone : for no other Power was a party to them : and in strict punctilio Japan may conceive herself justified in excluding any other participation. But when the subject has proved intractable, when a new and vastly more important instrument than any Manchurian treaty has since been created in the Covenant of the League for the handling of such disputes, when, moreover, both parties to the dispute are also signatories to the Covenant, the case is profoundly altered. Moreover, at no time during the making or signing of the Covenant did Japan challenge its jurisdiction in the Far East ; she made no attempt to restrict its operation, in the way she endeavoured to exclude from the Consortium Agreement, for instance, certain of her Manchurian and Mongolian undertakings ; and she accepted the Lytton Commission in December, 1931, thus giving the League

a footing in the Manchurian problem. There is here an apparent contradiction which must be cleared up.

This issue is important in itself ; but there lies behind it a vista of foreboding possibilities. Peace in the Pacific Ocean to-day rests on the threefold foundation of (1) the Covenant of the League, (2) the Kellogg Pact, (3) the Washington Treaties of 1922. These are parts of one structure, the character of which was clearly revealed by America, who, though not a member of the League, is an actively interested party. Her interpretation of the Kellogg Pact and the Washington Treaties of 1922 is made in the spirit of the Covenant, and there is nothing in it to which the members of the League can well object. The American position was defined by Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, on February 24, 1932.¹¹ He pointed out that the agreements of 1922, signed at Washington :

- (1) Pledged the four Powers of America, Great Britain, France, and Japan, to respect the insular possessions of each of them in the Pacific Ocean.
- (2) Bound the nine Powers of America, Great Britain, France, Japan, and four others (China being the ninth

signatory) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to help China to develop and maintain a stable government and to maintain the Open Door.

- (3) On the basis of this policy of conciliation, England, America, and Japan agreed to reduce their naval armaments, and the two former undertook not to fortify Guam, the Philippine Islands, and Hong-Kong.¹²

In the opinion of the American Government these treaties stand and fall together. No one of them can be disregarded without disturbing the general equilibrium of them all; and, Mr. Stimson, looking at events in Manchuria and in Shanghai, declared that it was "clear beyond a peradventure that a situation had developed which could not under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of these two treaties" (*i.e.* Nine Power and Kellogg Pact) which had not been faithfully observed. This might have been a mere academic opinion but for the sting in the tail of Mr. Stimson's warning. He clearly hinted that if Japan interpreted

the Nine Power Treaty as permitting action such as she took in Shanghai in 1932, America for her part could not remain bound by the Naval Disarmament Treaty, and a new bellicose era might thus arise in the Pacific in which Japan could not hope to rival America in naval power. The warning was needed, for neither in Japan nor in Europe were the implications of Japanese action fully understood. America does not want war, nor does she mean war, but she possesses resources so great that if larger preparation for war is necessary she will make it.

There is therefore something far greater than Japanese interests in Manchuria at stake; and if the evolution of Japanese opinion turns in the direction of militarism, not only will its repercussions in America and Europe tend to undermine the slowly rising edifice of conciliation, arbitration, and moral security based on the Covenant of the League, but the future relations of East and West may be sharply turned from the present path of gradual improvement back into the old jungle of conflict. A revival of militarist imperialism in Japan will breed fear once more in China, Russia will not look on unmoved, and the British Dominions

will demand from the Old Country a new naval policy as an insurance against the dangers thus created. Round the whole wide circumference of the Pacific Ocean the clouds of distrust will gather and the political development of Eastern peoples, in peaceful co-operation with the nations of the Old World and America, will be distorted, if not completely arrested, by the fear of a great conflict, where united confidence is so urgently needed. This is no idle alarm; it is one of the possible, if not probable, outcomes of the contemporary situation in the Far East. But if the nations concerned in it are awake to its danger, it may never be realised. We must ask, therefore, how probable it is.

The answer lies in Japan. If the Japanese Government interprets its position in the world of to-day in the light of *all* the facts, and measures with a realistic eye the advantages of a pacific policy against the risks of militarism, there can be little doubt of the final decision. It has been evident for some years past that Japanese opinion has been sharply divided on the merits of the two courses, and in gauging the temper of the militarist school we must remember that the generation of men who control Japan to-day

and are now between the ages of fifty and sixty was brought up in the patriotic and sacrificial spirit of the Manchurian War of 1904-1905, and cherish the memory of its trials and triumphs with an almost spiritual fervour. Few, if any, of them have any personal experience of the international problems of Japan either in the earlier days of the reformed Empire (1868-95) or in the period immediately preceding the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1895-1902). They do not know what isolation means. They are therefore rashly prepared to play a lone hand, and they judge the immediate risks of the game too lightly. They know that Russia cannot be ignored, but they believe her incapable of immediate war on a large scale. America is a distant voice to which they listen with a contemptuous scepticism : and Europe is too far off to find a place in the picture. In thus describing the militarist attitude I do not accept as authentic the famous "Tanaka Memorial" of 1926 which preached full-blooded jingoism, but the spirit which it expresses is alive in the Japanese Right Wing to-day and must be reckoned as a power in Japanese politics.

Were it the only power in Japan the outlook for peace in the Pacific would be dark.

But there is another school of thought which takes a different view of Japan's destiny and would have her treat the problem of her relations with China as a challenge to constructive political action and not as a provocation to fight. It is no mere pacific sentimentality, but a shrewd and far-sighted view of Japan's place in the modern world and of her fundamental interests that moves this group to support the League and to take part in the development of the new system of collective responsibility under the Covenant in company with the other leading Powers. They know that Japan in isolation is Japan in danger. They see that the Washington Naval Treaty gave her complete security in her own waters, and they acknowledge the public spirit of America in giving up her commanding lead in battleship construction in 1922; but they fear that to use the security thus gained as the foundation of new aggressive power is to put the security itself in jeopardy. Moreover, they reply to those who would "teach China a lesson" by force, that the boycott will not yield to the bayonet and that only by patient constructive action can the growing Japanese interests in China flourish. In the end, this school of thought will win, if it can but hold fast to the true

reasons for its faith. It has the power of the purse and is led by men who command national respect. For the moment, it is not only powerless in the face of a clamour of outraged patriotism, but has lost some of its finest leaders by assassination. Its time will come again ; and it is the part of wisdom for the watching world to refrain from that kind of provocative criticism which indicts a whole nation, and to show the Japanese people that, while it cannot approve of certain features of recent Japanese policy, it appreciates their economic difficulties and understands the peculiar problems which they have to face in China.

This conflict of opinion in Japan, which prompts the quotation from Marco Polo at the head of this chapter, is but one of many features in the transition from old to new. Japan is in theory a constitutional autocracy ; in practice a military oligarchy ; and only in the promise of the future, a democracy. The significant feature in her modern history is her preservation of the traditional principle of autocracy as the pivot of the Constitution. She has thus secured continuity. In preparing herself to compete with the rest of the modern world, she imported the methods and instruments of scientific progress, but

excluded as far as she could the politics of Europe. The politics of democracy now invade her life, with issues yet unknown, but her parliamentary experience has been marred by such flagrant corruption that her public is now in a ready mood for some cleaner alternative. She has escaped the catastrophic rupture of ancient custom which has brought chaos in its train in other Asiatic countries ; and if she can pursue steadily the course of political development which has raised her to such prominence, she may yet become the supreme object lesson for all Asiatic peoples. She is only midway on that course, and her domestic condition is too unstable to justify any prediction of her future. That she has proved her title to be regarded as one of the Great Powers is self-evident ; that she is loyal to her obligations in the long run is her own proud boast ; that her people possess the qualities, both moral and physical, which make a great nation is also true ; but she has yet to prove that she can elevate an economic proletariat to the standing of a responsible electorate. There is no more significant experiment in Asia to-day than the endeavour of Japan to combine democracy with allegiance to an ancient throne.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE : APPEASEMENT OR CONFLICT ?

. . . Mankind is once more on the move . . . the very foundations have been shaken . . . the tents have been struck and the great caravan of Humanity is once more on the march.

GENERAL SMUTS.

THE European mind has long been accustomed to conceive of the civilised world in terms of the antithesis of East and West. We still use the language of the contrast for convenience, but we have seen, in the course of this brief study, that the antithesis breaks down when we approach the East and discover such wide differences between its component parts as to forbid us to consider it as an organic whole possessing any real inner unity. We have been the children of a too simple geography in this matter and have taken Asia as one because it is a continuous land-block and because we professed to find throughout it a group of physical conditions and human qualities which not only made Asia a realm apart from us, but gave it a

oneness of its own. If our geography had been written for us by the classical Chinese, we should have learnt to see the world as composed of one central region, known as the Middle Kingdom (*i.e.* China), surrounded by a fringe of more or less barbarian vassal states, with no continental frontiers between East and West, but only a division of mankind into higher and lower, the Chinese above and the rest below. If, again, we had taken our view of the universe from the Hindu, there would have been no geographical or racial division but a horizontal separation of classes, the "twice-born" Brahman above, the warrior and merchant castes in the middle, and a vast proletariat of untouchables and outcasts beneath, among whom would have been reckoned the whole human race living overseas from India, including the highest of Europe's cultured peoples. In still a third conception, the Moslem divides the world into faithful and infidel, and reckons the Christian West nearer himself than Hindu India.

The false generalisation about the unity of Asia underlies much that has been written on the future of East and West. A generation ago, European writers anxiously discussed the prospect raised by the Japanese

victory over Russia, in terms of "the rising tide of colour," the "revolt against civilisation," and the "Yellow Peril," and they conceived Asia as preparing a great revenge against Europe. They foresaw a time when, with Japan as the spear-head of a counter-attack upon the West, the eastern peoples would once more rise to overwhelm us. The teeming man-power of Asia was paraded as great armies of invasion, and the eye of fear saw our Western civilisation as a giant with feet of clay destined to fall before the Eastern foe. The alarm never had any substance ; it presumed a unity of purpose in Asia which does not exist ; and though we must read the awakening of Asia as a many-sided challenge to the prestige of Europe, it offers no vital threat to our essential security. To add up the millions of China and India, and multiply them by the power of Japan, is the arithmetic of Bedlam.

The problem before us in the twentieth century is therefore not one of apocalyptic strategy, with gigantic forces disputing in battle the fate of two continents. It is an adjustment of long-standing controversies arising in culture, commerce, and politics, which will find no appeasement or solution in the use of force on either side. There

may be wars before they are settled ; but it is a profound mistake to assume that they must inevitably issue in war, or that there is not a fair prospect of finding a solution by constructive political action. The historical origin of our differences has been described in the first chapter, and their development in Chapters II, III, and IV. We are to-day face to face with the contemporary result. And the first thing to note is that Asia is no longer supine, nor Europe arrogant. Europe remains, indeed, the most important political continent, and I see no reason to doubt the continuance of her well-founded prestige ; but she is no longer the sole arbiter of the world. Viewing the entire scene, in a serene perspective, we find a working hypothesis in the threefold conclusion that :

- (1) Europe remains the central political area in the world, for the key to peace and progress still lies in European hands, albeit the ability to use it is limited, while America halts in her old path and hesitates to take the new ;
- (2) the new power, and (may we say ?) the enlarged outlook, of America has greatly lessened the old preponderance of Europe ; and

- (3) the Eastern Hemisphere comes to supply a new and weighty element necessitating the establishment of a new equilibrium for the whole.

Henceforth the world of international affairs will revolve on the poles of Orient and Occident. The polar simile conveys succinctly the idea that, if these two areas are, in fact, poles apart, they are not isolated ; for, revolving on one axis, they act and react upon each other and so create that new equipoise described above. The true way of seeing the world, and seeing it whole, does not permit us to regard Europe, America, or Asia as poles, *i.e.* as axle-ends in themselves, for we are looking at a globe on which our belated discovery of the importance of the East has placed a new factor which completes the true circle of world affairs. It follows that the simile of the axle was apt only in so far as it has led us to conceive of the world as a globe whose steadiness in motion depends on the counterpoise of its component parts. Conceiving the civilised earth, politically, as identical in character and motion with its astronomical self, it is a sphere composed of Eastern and Western Hemispheres. Europe in its former self-centred importance was but a broken arc :

America and the East come in to make the perfect round.

Perhaps the very heart of our present study lies in the question: Do they, in fact, "come in"? And if so, how? If they do, the problem of international relations on their world-wide scale is that of making the component parts of our sphere obey in politics the laws which in astronomy make the earth a planet pursuing its orderly course through space. This implies co-operation towards an agreed end upon generally accepted principles. In nature, the hemispheres co-operate because they must; for them there is no escape from one another, for they are bound together like "an army of unalterable law." In politics that lesson has yet to be learned; the end is not yet agreed nor the principles of co-operation for peace generally accepted; but the world shows the will to learn and has made some progress in the new lesson. But if America and the Far East do not "come in" to make the perfect round: if there is a "separateness" in the Pacific Ocean (for instance) which demands a special and separate treatment: if the United States of America finds in the Pacific area new and good reasons for maintaining its historic isolation: if the existing organs of

the League of Nations are inherently inadequate for Eastern purposes : if, in a word, the East still stands apart and the Pacific Ocean can be interned in *vacuo suo* ; then, indeed, there is ground for apprehension regarding the future, the disasters of Europe may be repeated on the other side of the globe, and when calamity thus overtakes this New World of Asia will the Old not also suffer loss ?

The desired equilibrium of the whole is disturbed because some of the parts are unequal in essential weight, unstable, and lacking internal cohesion, and uncertain of their function in the political evolution of the planet. Each of the three great Asiatic countries which we have seen in our bird's-eye view is faced with two problems at once. It has to find its own true character and institutions for orderly life within, and it has to bring itself into line with international changes now in progress without. Either of these alone would be a great task ; and taken together they are formidable. But, as we have seen in China, for instance, their weight is to some extent relieved by the offer of assistance from other nations ; and in proportion as that assistance is fruitful, it brings the domestic solution nearer and improves

foreign relations. The co-operation of League experts not only helps China, it also helps the League in ways which are discussed below.

Now the remaining space of this chapter limits us once more to select the significant, leaving much that is important to other pens ; and since we have surveyed the internal scene in India, China, and Japan, we will take for brief treatment five subjects of international import which concern all three and closely touch the West as well.

(1) The difference of race and colour is an obstinate and disturbing fact in the relations of East and West. The individual can surmount the obstacle with ease if he approaches his dealings with the East in the proper spirit ; but in mass-contacts of whole peoples it creates unpleasant friction and blocks the path of co-operation. Take three prominent instances of its operation since the War : the defeat of the Racial Equality Resolution proposed by the Japanese at the inauguration of the League of Nations in 1919, or the exclusion of Asiatics from America, or the position of coloured India in the white Commonwealth of British Nations, and you will see how the instinctive recoil of one race from another complicates

the problem of political relations. At the Peace Conference the United Kingdom delegates were not disposed to refuse the Japanese request ; but Mr. Hughes, representing White Australia and supported by America, would not assent, and all he could offer to Baron Makino was the principle of equality in respect of Asiatic nationals already resident in Australia as opposed to intending immigrants. This was the solution actually adopted for Indians in Australia three years later. The exclusion of Asiatics from America, in its turn, created much bad blood between the United States and Japan, though the Chinese said little about it ; and so deeply was the insult felt that one distinguished Japanese friend of mine, himself a man of liberal mind, has since refused to set foot on American soil. The American policy was enacted with a ruthless disregard of Asiatic feeling, and while other races were put upon a quota the peoples of the East were bluntly excluded. If America had placed the Japanese on the quota with the English, the Irish, the Poles, and the Germans, she would have practically achieved her purpose of exclusion without raising the spectre of race-antagonism. It was this tactlessness of method, more than

the principle involved, which tried Japanese patience ; but it must be acknowledged that the attitude of the Japanese Government under its provocation was beyond praise.

The solution of this problem is not yet in sight ; and, in approaching it we must remember that it is not one-sided, nor does the provocation come from the white peoples only. Speaking generally, the dislike of mixed marriages is as strong in Asia as it is in the West. To the Hindu we are un-touchable. There was a well-known Indian prince who ostentatiously advertised his fear of contamination by wearing white gloves without which he would not shake hands with a European, and many Indians cannot sit at table with us except under the penalty of losing caste, while some will not ! The Chinese, on the other hand, are personally free from race-prejudice, they mingle and inter-marry freely with other peoples ; and the Japanese, though awkward in mingling, are neither so exclusive nor so intolerant as the caste Hindu. The long intercourse of East and West has made a breach in the barrier, but as a political factor of bitterness it still stands between us. It is fundamental to the problem of India's place in the British Commonwealth, wherein it is more

delicate to treat than in any other region in Asia ; and unless a working agreement can be found, the inclusion of a brown race in the greatest political family the world has ever known may prove impossible.

Experience suggests, however, that the difficulty may yet be overcome. There is room for the expansion of the Gentlemen's Agreement which regulated Japanese-American relations on the subject for many years. On the merits of the white attitude, no one who has studied the problem can fail to appreciate the economic motive behind the White Australia policy ; but neither California nor White Australia have said their last word upon it : nor, with the ever-rising tide of nationalism in the East, have we heard the last from that quarter. The League has already accepted as final the domestic sovereignty of each Power in deciding the character of its national population and their standard of life, and the aggrieved Oriental must accept this as a ground principle. But if the Western peoples maintain their stiff attitude on exclusion, they will invite retaliation from the governments of the East, and it is advisable in the interest of all that the ensuing conflict should be avoided. The time will soon be ripe for the treatment of

the subject under the auspices of the League ; and when the moment arrives to promulgate general principles in the form of a convention under the Covenant, it will be both feasible and right to reconcile the existing recognition of domestic sovereignty with the widest possible declaration of racial equality.

(2) The legacy of the past lies heavily on present relations with the East. By this I do not mean its visible results in extra-territoriality and the like. They are difficult enough : but behind them lies the reputation which the Western Powers, in general, and Great Britain in particular, have in the Eastern mind. Both the Chinese and the Indians have been wont to regard England as the chief practitioner of European aggression. Till recent times the Chinese ignored the evidence of history and made England the main object of nationalist hostility. Other Powers were also sinners, but their transgression was reckoned small compared with that of England. And there is still a strong tendency in all Indian and Chinese propaganda to make foreign imperialism the author of evils that really spring from domestic sources. This feature must be eradicated from the Oriental mind before international relations can become normal.

A true interpretation of history is needed. The Western Powers are entitled to claim that, even if they must bear a heavy responsibility for part of this legacy in Eastern psychology, their present attitude to the problems of India and China alike offers no justification for prolonging the quarrels of the past.

India now knows that progress to her self-government is stayed, not by British opposition, but by the failure of Indian statesmanship to remove indigenous obstacles that stand in the way of national unity. China has learned in recent years that the enemies of her peace are in her own household, and with this growing sense of reality there has come a new Chinese view of those whom they were wont to denounce as predatory imperialists. The opportunity offered by this change in China's state of mind is one which the West ought to grasp with both hands, for it denotes a disposition to let the past bury its dead and to face the future in a spirit of co-operation.

(3) There are some practical obstacles to this co-operation which must be removed. If one were addressing an open letter to the Chinese people, for instance, it would show how an intelligent and sympathetic exposition

of the hopes and fears, the achievements, the failures, and the immense magnitude of the Revolution has succeeded in gaining a good opinion of China throughout the modern West. On the foundation of that goodwill China can build high, if she builds wisely. But the writer of the Open Letter would go on to say that in the present situation there are features which gravely hamper the friends of China in their efforts on her behalf. The school-books of China, for instance, tend to turn the minds of the children towards the evils of the past and to breed in them suspicion of the foreigner. On such sustenance nationalism need no longer feed ; and it is high time to turn the face of youth to the future and to bid the young generation welcome as allies those whom their fathers once learned to hate. Moreover, Chinese propaganda, like all partial statements, only deals with some of the facts. It would create a much better impression if it were more candid and more restrained. Nay, more, it is not too much to say that the prompt payment of even a few of China's financial obligations at present in default would do more to promote the Chinese cause in Europe and America than the most skilful pamphleteering can ever

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do. The day of sentimental propaganda is over.

But let me not be mistaken. China, to her infinite credit, has never repudiated her major loans. To serve them she has paid money to her foreign creditors which was urgently needed for her own use ; and she has made her punctual payment, through the Maritime Customs, not because she could not easily have followed the Russian example and denied all the obligations of regimes that are gone, but because she knew that her credit abroad was at stake, and on that credit her stability must depend in large measure. The Chinese reply that the loans in default are mainly railway obligations, that civil war has made nearly all her lines bankrupt, and that it will take years of rehabilitation to place them on a satisfactory earning basis again. That is the bald truth ; but it is not the whole truth, and the story of the remitted British Boxer Indemnity, of very recent days, affords proof for the charge that both financial and treaty obligations are often ignored. In these circumstances China's credit suffers ; and, though we cannot expect its immediate or early restoration, though we make generous allowance for her distress in flood and famine, the

moral of this plea remains. And I, for one, do not doubt that some of her best leaders recognise it.

(4) It was hinted above that China might have followed the example of Soviet Russia in repudiating the political and financial obligations of the defunct Empire and of Yuan Shih-kai. The fact that she did not do so proves that the influence of Bolshevik Communism is not paramount in Eastern Asia to-day, if it ever has been. But since there are still many who believe that the Chinese Revolution, like Indian nationalism, owes much of its power, if not its very existence, to Russia, it is necessary to say a word upon the part which Russia has played. The reading of history, given in the first chapter of this book, from the European Renaissance down to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, surely makes it clear that, even if Lenin had never existed and the Bolshevik Revolution never taken place, we should still be face to face with insurgent nationalism in the East to-day. The movement which awakened Asia came from the West, and it is upon the British, French, and American revolutions that we must place the responsibility for the new character of politics in the East. Russia came late on the scene,

but because she contrived to pour into the Oriental mind a draught of her own intoxicant, we are tempted to throw the blame on her. Those who so interpret history give her credit which she does not deserve.

None the less there can be little doubt that Soviet Russia, like Imperial Russia before her, holds some of the keys to the whole problem, and is more likely to play a decisive part in the economic, if not the political, development of the Far East than the Tsars could ever do. I have called Japan the Janus of the East, and the title is true, for Japan turns now one way, now the other : but the name is also apt for Russia in her half-Asiatic, half-European character. She, too, faces both ways. She needs Europe, she aspires to lead Asia. Between revolutionary ambition and growing economic need she wavers, now breaking into orgy, now recovering to sobriety, and it is significant that the trend of her recent behaviour has turned her more and more towards constructive acts in Europe than towards destruction in Asia. The conflict within her soul is not over ; her warfare is not accomplished : but wisdom is awake and grows. Our part in her metamorphosis is to enable her to return, without excessive delay or irritating

penalty, to the European family. For thus we shall ease Europe and save Asia from direct conflict.

In the prospect thus opened the Five Year Plan will play no small part. It is the greatest economic effort now being made in the world ; and, as it progresses, it will make twentieth-century Russia not only a great producer but a great consumer, whose demands will vastly stimulate the trade of other nations. The Plan itself is now labouring through the period of growing pains, and the world hears more of its stupendous difficulties, its inevitable lapses into disorder, and the human revolt provoked by its pressure upon the patient masses, than of its progress. But the proof of its vitality lies in those very incidents which Western critics are apt to quote as evidence of its foredoomed failure. There is widespread self-criticism in modern Russia ; and the Communist Party, under Stalin's realistic leadership, is ready to face the defects of to-day because they believe in the success of to-morrow. To them the *Schadenfreude* of capitalist observers is irrelevant ; and they comfort themselves with the knowledge that whereas the Five Year Plan was dismissed by the West, at its birth, as a revolutionary

dream, to-day it is treated as a subject of serious study by every competent student of the problems of the modern world. To have thus forced capitalism to take them seriously is the best proof that the Bolsheviki could desire of the essential merit of their policy.

But more lies behind. The Five Year Plan is not yet a finished achievement, nor does Stalin himself believe that its harvest can be reaped in his lifetime. He knows that he is but the sower in spring and that others will enjoy the fruits of his labours. But, even in its inchoate form, it possesses an advertising value for other lands now in process of exploiting their own resources for the first time. The undeveloped regions of the earth, of which China is the great example, are awaiting just such an impetus to new growth as the Russian plan might give; and the day may come, even soon, when Eastern peoples will be persuaded that the capitalist impulse is exhausted and will turn to the great Communist exemplar for guidance. The present disease in capitalism is too deep-rooted to be quickly cured. It shakes the old confident belief in the permanence of Western economic power, and it has broken out at a moment when the prestige of the West in Asia is challenged,

in the economic field, as well as the political. Therefore, if Russia, discarding the subversive weapons of intransigent political communism, were to approach the East, and particularly China, with the seductive promise of prosperity, through planning, the Chinese might be ready to receive her with open arms once more. At present Moscow is too deeply preoccupied with her own critical condition to be able to spare any energies for so great a task as the economic tutelage of China. Her time may come, but to-day the West holds the field and has its greatest opportunity. The Chinese look to London, Washington, and Geneva in the hope of political help. They know that they would look in vain to Russia for reconstruction loans and that only the money markets of the West can supply their financial need. Moreover, Geneva can plan for them, adapting, if needful, the Five Year Plan to Chinese conditions ; and if the present beginnings of co-operation between China and the League are not arrested by political disappointment with the achievement of the League in the Japanese dispute, we may look with a sober and restrained confidence to the future. This leads us naturally to the fifth point.

(5) The position of the League in Asia

is still insecure. Neither the moral inspiration of the Covenant, nor the practical experiments in the new collective system, are fully known or understood throughout the East. The leading Powers in the League are China's old imperialist intruders, and the Chinese are sceptical about their change of heart. Japan, on the other hand, was proud of her part in creating the new order and of her permanent place on the Council. In moments of irritation she may appear to deny its use to her; and there are, as we have seen, powerful forces in her political life that openly disavow the principles on which the League was founded, just as there are in France or England to-day—*only*, in England, at all events, they do not guide or create policy. On the whole, Japan has appreciated the League better than any other Asiatic nation; her Governments from 1919 to 1930 faithfully discharged their new obligations, and, although her present mood is unfaithful, it would be hasty to assume that she will therefore forsake the League altogether. The Indian has a certain sentimental feeling for Geneva, which appeals to his idea of brotherhood philosophically; but in contemporary political fact many Indians regard their delegation at the Assembly as

the voice of England speaking from under the disguise of a *puggaree*. India will not take the League seriously until she begins really to take charge of her own affairs at home.

Except Japan, the nations of Asia had little part in the creation of the League. They saw the Powers forming a new society in Europe, and suspected that "new Presbyter was but old Priest writ large." Their scepticism coloured their whole view of the new order; and as long as the creators of the new regime were engaged in various experiments designed to give it the required organs for political action, they could not believe that the apparent change of heart was permanent. Indeed, these experiments seemed to prove that the leading members of the League had not made up their minds upon its true function, and the East professed to see in the resulting uncertainty a good reason for not placing entire faith in Geneva. The inevitable preoccupation of the League with European problems arising from the War also made it appear to be a society of essentially European scope, which had little time or concern for the East. This is, certainly, a mistaken view, but it is not unnatural and can change but slowly.

The long process of trial and error, which led the League from the establishment of the Permanent Court at the Hague, through the Protocol, the Mutual Guarantee, Locarno, etc., with continuous disarmament conferences playing a parallel part in the problem, was to Asia proof of deep political disagreement in Europe. No doubt it was, but to the public mind of our continent it was much more. It proved to the nations that their governments, though slow and faint-hearted compared with their peoples—an undoubted fact!—had accepted the League as the nerve centre of international relations and that they realised the fearful alternative of a failure to make it a reality. Through twelve difficult years, public opinion has held the governments to this commitment, and finds the final proof of the vitality of the League ideal in the long-pursued search for institutions which will give it the organs of active life. Here is invisible power at work. Asia is too distant to feel as yet the influence it wields; but even distance does not conceal from the East some of the merits of the new order.

The League must approach its duty to Asia with caution. Being as yet insecurely established in Europe and unfamiliar to

Eastern peoples, it cannot embark on any extra-European task with complete confidence. It was obvious before the Far Eastern crisis arose that if any political problem should demand treatment before Geneva was ready for the undertaking, the result would be disastrous to the future of the League, because the test would be premature. And so it nearly proved in the winter of 1931-32, though the League achieved much, if not by any means all that was possible, in the circumstances. It is clear, at any rate, that effective access for the League to those countries which doubt its political usefulness must be taken by way of co-operation in the non-political field; and the plans of the three sections of the Secretariat, made in consultation with the Chinese Government, already give proof of this belief. The experts of the League are often excellent ambassadors, acting as forerunners for its political action; and I need only add that it would be a notable advertisement of the whole function and character of the League itself if a meeting of the Council could some day be held in the Far East. New international relations between Asiatic and Asiatic, between Asiatic and European, between both and America, are

in the making. The great kaleidoscope of Asia revolves with a new momentum, and the fragments move to and fro in an unfamiliar design. There is internationalism, as well as nationalism, in this new Asia; and each turn of the instrument shows patterns which tend to remain constant behind all the momentous changes in setting and colour. The pacific influence of the League may yet bring these moving pieces to rest in a permanent design of international co-operation; and it should be the aim of all concerned to work to that end.

Not Asia alone, but the whole world, seeks a plan of international relations which may some day make the sovereignties of our purely national States seem obsolete. Even during the War three great doctrines, supra-national rather than international, emerged above the strife: the League of Nations, Mittel-Europa, and the Bolshevik idea. Each of them presaged a spiritual condition of Europe which would cause frontiers to lose significance; and, though each was so different from the other that they inevitably came into conflict, all three had the same birthplace, in an uneasy world-wide discontent with the purely national basis of the old European system. With the arising of

such conceptions, the day of national sovereignty began to wane. Geneva now shows what the new day may be.

The future of Asia is to be read in similar terms. The great mark of interrogation which hangs over its steppes and mountains can be expressed in many ways. Can this huge and diversified continent ever march united against the West? Will it find in the new Soviet world the way to its ambition? Or, again, will not the League of Nations carry the benefit of its spirit and its method to Young Asia and thus draw the sting from the feud between East and West? Geneva or Moscow? is the sum of these queries, which are written on the whole landscape from Riga to Tokyo, from the Arctic Ocean to Singapore.

But though they seem to foreshadow an ominous future, there is in them some promise of appeasement as well as threat of conflict. In the early days of the Revolution Russia cast herself loose from Western civilisation and lost her place in the European family. To-day, experience brings her nearer the fold once more. Her central purpose is still intact, but her many experiments have taught her that the economic laws which she believed she could defy with impunity are

no heartless invention of capitalism, but eternal in the dealings of man with man. Moreover, her fiery conviction that the world must follow the Soviet example in Revolution has lost its early glow, and there are signs that she will not demand conformity as the condition of normal relations with other nations. In a word, the promoter of the World Revolution seems to be changing her mind. Her agents still work underground, but the zeal of their earlier crusade has declined ; and the peoples of Asia will not easily accept their aid unless they are convinced that there is no help from other and better allies.

Therefore the great query that hangs over the Eastern scene need not be read with dismay. It is no sooner set before us than we see how its stark shadow obscures the truth. There is reason to doubt the insight of those who read the problem of East and West in the light of sharp distinctions and inevitable conflicts. Difference, deep and abiding, there may be, there will always be ; and we must hope that the enrichment of humanity, derived from the diverse talents of its many peoples, will never be lost in a dreary uniformity. For, if the price of universal peace be indeed universal sameness,

the world will rather choose unending war than such a death of its soul. But, in hoping that the many families of mankind, of all colours and faiths, will retain those individual qualities which have enabled them to make their past contribution to human history, and in believing that they have greater gifts still to bring, we yet affirm our faith that the common achievement which awaits them all is to take their differences to the high ground of a new world order, and there compose them in peace.

NOTES

The notes which follow refer to the numerals to be found here and there in the pages of this book, and are intended to give a list of books to which the reader may care to turn in pursuit of any line of study suggested by what he has read. The list is not a bibliography; it is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive; but is intended to set up signposts for the reader to follow.

CHAPTER I

- (1) *The Expansion of Europe.* By Ramsay Muir. London. 1922.
The Expansion of Europe. By W. C. Abbott. New York. 1918.

- (2) *Asia and Europe.* By Meredith Townsend. London. 1901.

A remarkable book which is still worth reading after thirty years, though some of its judgments have proved to be wrong.

- (3) *An Essay on the Civilisations of India, China, and Japan.* By G. Lowes Dickinson. London. 1913.

In this little volume the well-known Cambridge philosopher gave an illuminating study of the East which has lost little of its value, though published twenty years ago.

- (4) *The Ideals of the East.* By Okakura Kakuzo. London. 1920.

As essay by a Japanese scholar of acknowledged authority. It opens with the words "Asia is one!"

- (5) *A History of Nationalism in the East.* By Hans Kohn. London. 1929.

A useful study originally written in German. On page 17 the reader will find an interesting map of the "Areas of Common Destiny in the Political World of To-day," which presents a suggestive contrast to my argument.

CHAPTER II

INDIA

- (1) *The Ramayana and the Mahabharata.* Everyman's Library.
- (2) *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher.* By Count Keyserling. 1925.
- (3) *The Education of India.* By Arthur Mayhew. London. 1926.

An interesting review which includes in its scope a picture of the social and political results of modern education.

- (4) *India.* By Sir Valentine Chirol. (Modern World Series.) London. 1926.

A survey by an experienced student of the East.

Peoples and Problems of India. By Sir Thomas Holderness. Home University Library.

A useful introduction to India.

India: a Bird's-Eye View. By Lord Ronaldshay. London. 1924.

The Heart of Aryavarta. By Lord Ronaldshay. London. 1925.

Two admirable volumes by the former Governor of Bengal.

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India Insistent. By Sir Harcourt Butler. London. 1931.

A compact little book based on the experience of a lifetime, and written with a vivid pen. Its conclusions reflect some of the pessimism of the moment.

Thoughts on Indian Discontents. By Edwyn Bevan. London. 1929.

Suggestive chapters by one of the most sympathetic English writers on Indian politics.

- (5) *The Oxford History of India.* By Vincent Smith. Oxford. 1920.

The story of India from early times to the Delhi Durbar of 1911.

- (6) *The Hindu View of Life.* By S. Radhakrishnan. London. 1927.

Here the professor of philosophy in the University of Calcutta expounds to a Western audience the Hindu interpretation of the Universe.

Modern Religious Movements in India. By J. N. Farquhar. London. 1918.

A succinct review of a century of religious development, showing the movements of reform within the Hindu pale.

- (7) *Psalms of the Maratha Saints.* By N. Macnicol. Oxford Press. 1920.

A translation into English verse of the beautiful religious poetry of the Deccan, by a Scottish missionary. His Introduction is particularly valuable in its sympathetic comparison of Hinduism at its best with Christianity.

- (8) *Mahatma Gandhi*. By R. M. Gray and Manilal Parekh. London. 1924.

A monograph in "the Builders of Modern India" series, which gives a friendly but not uncritical account of the subject.

Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story. By C. F. Andrews. London. 1930.

Mahatma Gandhi: At Work. By C. F. Andrews. London. 1931.

Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas. By C. F. Andrews. London. 1929.

These three volumes, which would gain if compressed into two, by one of Mr. Gandhi's closest English friends, are indispensable to any attempt to understand him.

- (9) The problem of 1919 is set out in the *Report on Constitutional Reforms* by the Right Honourable Edwin Montagu, M.P., and Lord Chelmsford; indispensable as a historical document and very readable. The whole subject is again examined, more comprehensively, in the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (Sir John Simon), of which Volume I, "Survey," is beyond praise. Volume II, "Recommendations," should be read along with *East India (Constitutional Reforms)*, 1930, which contains the views of Lord Irwin's Government on the conclusions of the Simon Commission. The next stage will be found in the *Report of the Round Table Conference* (1930, 1931). And the annual review of Indian conditions, published under the title of *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress of India*, is indispensable to the serious student.

All of these are issued by H.M. Stationery Office, London.

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- (10) *East India (Indian States)*. The Report of the Indian States Enquiry Committee of 1928, under Sir Harcourt Butler, which describes their relation to British India and the Crown.

Scraps of Paper. By A. P. Nicholson. London. 1930.

The well-known parliamentary journalist here presents the view of the Indian princes, and airs their grievances against the Government of India.

Relations of Indian States with the Government of India. By K. M. Panikhar. London. 1927.

A useful commentary by an Indian writer, who describes the past relations and forecasts the future.

- (11) A good modern book on economics is the *Economic Development of India*, by Vera Anstey, London, 1929 ; and the essence of the agricultural problem is to be found in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India* (Stationery Office), of which an abridged edition was published in 1928. See also *Socrates in an Indian Village*, by F. L. Brayne (Oxford, 1929), and *Rusticus Loquitur*, by M. L. Darling (Oxford, 1930). Two books which vividly describe life in the villages of Northern India.

CHAPTER III

CHINA

- (1) *The Good Earth*. By Pearl Buck. London. 1931.

A novel of Chinese life written with knowledge and imagination.

A Son of China. By Sheng-Cheng. London. 1930.

The story of a family, which gives a good insight into the lives and thoughts of the Chinese.

- (2) *A Short History of Chinese Civilisation.* By Richard Wilhelm.

A brief account of the growth of China from ancient times which gives the indispensable background of the modern movement.

The Civilisation of China. By H. A. Giles. Home University Library.

A compact and workmanlike primer.

China: An Analysis. By Frank J. Goodrow. Baltimore. 1926.

A useful introduction to China.

Modern China: A Political Study. By S. G. Cheng. Oxford University Press. 1919.

Though some of this book is out of date, it still has a considerable value.

- (3) *These from the Land of Sinim.* By Sir Robert Hart. London. 1901.

A prophetic account of coming changes written in the form of articles in the *Fortnightly Review* during the siege of Peking in 1900.

- (4) *Foreign Diplomacy in China.* By Philip Joseph. London. 1928.

The best history yet written of the critical period, 1894-1900, in which China was threatened with dismemberment, commonly called the Battle of the Concessions; fully documented and reliable.

China and Foreign Powers. By Sir Frederick Whyte. London. 1928.

The background of history from 1842 to 1926, in an essay of fifty pages.

- (5) *The International Development of China.* By Sun Yat-sen. London. 1929.

Indispensable for an appreciation of Dr. Sun's mind and policy.

San Min Chu I; the Three Principles of the People.

Edited by L. T. Chen. Shanghai. 1927.

Lectures on policy by Dr. Sun. They reveal both the strength and the weakness of his treatment of political and economic subjects.

Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary. By Sun Yat-sen. London. 1927.

First written in 1918.

- (6) *The Chinese Revolution.* By A. N. Holcombe. London. 1930.

A valuable work on the principles of Sun Yat-sen, which gives a good account of the creation of the present form of government in China.

- (7) *The Chinese Revolution?* 1926-27. By H. O. Chapman. London. 1928.

A first-hand account of the Yangtse situation in 1926 by an Australian medical missionary who was at Hankow during the crisis of Sino-Russian relations.

- (8) *The Times.* January 5, 6, 7, and 14, 1929.

A series of articles on "Political China," by Sir Frederick Whyte.

- (9) A reliable account of current events in China, especially in the field of international relations, will be found in the relative sections of the ten volumes of the annual *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920 to 1931, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, under the able editorship of Professor Arnold Toynbee. The

reader may also be recommended to look at the back numbers of the *Round Table*.

- (10) *China: The Collapse of a Civilisation*. By Nathaniel Peffer. London. 1931.

A well-written study of the disintegration of the old order in China; the bibliography is good.

- (11) *The Capital Question of China*. By Lionel Curtis. 1932.

A timely and suggestive book.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN

- (1) *The Flight of the Dragon*. By Laurence Binyon. London. 1932.

A delightful study of the art of China and Japan by one of the greatest of living English poets, who is also an authority on Eastern art.

- (2) *The Pillow Book of Sei Shonagon*. Translated by Arthur Waley. London. 1928.

A miniature of Japan in the tenth century in the form of the journal of a lady of fashion.

The Tale of Genji. Translated from the Japanese of Lady Murasaki by Arthur Waley, in four volumes. London. 1925.

A picture of the unique, subtle, and highly developed civilisation which prevailed in Japan when King Alfred ruled in England.

- (3) *An Essay on the Civilisations of India, China, and Japan*. By G. Lowes Dickinson (see above).

- (4) *Japan*. By Inazo Nitobe. London. 1931.

A timely volume in the "Modern World Series" by a distinguished Japanese who has served many years in the League of Nations.

- (5) *Tales of Old Japan*. By Lord Redesdale. London. 1919.

The first edition of this book was published in 1871 when Lord Redesdale was second Secretary to the British Legation in Japan. Now in its fifteenth edition, it holds its place in public esteem. Its stories are readable and ring true.

- (6) *A History of Japan*. By James Murdoch. London. 1928.

A history from the earliest times to 1868.

The Civilisation of Japan. By J. I. Bryan. Home University Library.

- (7) General Sir Ian Hamilton bears witness to the all-pervading influence of Germany in the Japanese army in 1905 in the following words: "In Kuroki's First Army there was only one Staff-Officer speaking Russian and French; one speaking English; all the rest were not only German-trained, German-speaking, German-thinking men, but were spoken of in German slang terms by the young regimental officers as *Kaisermänner*. As in the case of any conscription country, the army was the national League of Youth, the vital part of Japan; the navy was British in sentiment, but, counting heads, that was a negligible quantity. This penetration of the German ideal into the Farthest East was military; it has yet to bear the fruits, and do not let us fall into the mistake of overlooking a principle because, owing to an

almost superhuman effort and our fine racial tenacity, we have smashed those who had expounded it." (*The Soul of an Army*. London. 1921.)

- (8) See the *Japan Year Book*, now published under the title of *The Empire of Japan*; also the *Manchurian Year Book*, the publications of the research office of the South Manchurian Railway, and the annual reports of the *Chinese Maritime Customs*.

- (9) *Manchuria, the Cockpit of Asia*. By P. T. Etherton and H. H. Tiltman. London. 1932.

A vivid account of the Manchurian problem which suffers somewhat from haste in preparation.

Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict. By Owen Lattimore. London. 1932.

The most recent book on the subject, and one of the best.

Japan's Special Position in Manchuria. By C. Walter Young. Oxford University Press. 1931.

The standard work on the subject.

A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria. By Sir Harold Parlett. London. 1929.

- (10) *The Round Table*. March, 1932.

Contains an apposite article of something more than ephemeral value.

- (11) *The Times*. February 25, 1932.

- (12) *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*. By Arnold J. Toynbee.

China at the Conference. By W. W. Willoughby. Baltimore. 1922.

The Washington Conference and After. By Y. Ichihashi. Stanford University Press. 1929.

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- (13) *The Japanese Population Problem*. By W. R. Crocker. London. 1931.

An excellent study of the question by an Australian Rhodes scholar.

- Modern Japan and its Problems*. By G. C. Allen. London. 1928.

A reliable survey.

- Japan's Economic Position*. By J. E. and D. J. Orchard. London. 1932.

A well-documented and comprehensive book, indispensable to the serious student.

- (14) *Japan: A Short Cultural History*. By G. B. Sansom. London. 1931.

The Commercial Counsellor to the British Embassy in Tokyo here gives the most recent and one of the best books on the subject, treating it in a way which will give the reader a true understanding.

CHAPTER V

The references given above are all pertinent to this chapter, but to them may be added the following suggestions. There is a great body of literature on the League of Nations to which the reader will find a useful guide in the Book Lists of the League of Nations Union (15 Grosvenor Crescent, London, S.W.1). On Russia, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, by Louis Fischer (London, 1930), is good in parts, but very unequal, and in places quite unreliable; in Salvador de Madariaga's *Disarmament* (Part III) will be found a brief but suggestive chapter on Russia; and *The Soviet Union Looks Ahead*

(London, 1929) gives the official prospectus, in a popular form, of the Five Year Plan presented by the Presidium of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) of the U.S.S.R. The statistical forecasts have been revised several times since it was published. It is difficult to recommend with confidence any book on Russia; but in the following list the reader can take his choice :—

I. GENERAL

Seven Years in Soviet Russia : with a retrospect. By Paul Scheffer. Authorised translation by A. Livingston. London. 1931.

A collection of articles from the *Berliner Tageblatt*, 1930. Of particular value as a study of the growth of the Soviet Union during the years 1922-29, but now somewhat out of date as picture of contemporary conditions.

Civic Training in Soviet Russia. By Samuel N. Harper. Chicago University Press. 1929.

Valuable; it describes the methods and channels by which the Communist Party spreads its influence through Russia. The author has been a life-long student of Russia.

Humanity Uprooted. By Maurice Hindus. London. 1929.

The author was born in Russia, went to America at the age of fourteen, and returned to Russia after eighteen years in 1923. He describes the changes—religious, social, and economic—brought about by the Revolution. See also his *Red Bread*, a picture of the peasant under the Soviet.

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The Challenge of Russia. By Sherwood Eddy. New York. 1931.

An American journalist's description of Soviet Russia, impressionistic rather than deep.

What Russia Intends. By Bruce Hopper. London. 1931.

A popular account of the Soviet system originally given in the form of lectures in the United States, of which the more satisfactory part describes the origin and rise of Bolshevism.

2. FIVE YEAR PLAN

The Economic Life of Soviet Russia. By Calvin B. Hoover. New York. 1931.

A good, serious work by the Professor of Economics in Duke University, U.S.A., who visited Russia in 1929 and 1930 as holder of a fellowship of the Social Science Research Council.

The Soviet Five Year Plan, and its effect on World Trade. By H. R. Knickerbocker. London. 1931.

The best popular work on the subject. The author is impressed with what the Soviets are doing, but is also critical. A fair presentation of the position.

The Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union: a political interpretation. By G. T. Grinko. London. 1930.

Rather rambling. Lacks detailed information. The author is a Soviet official in Moscow.

Soviet Russia and the World. By Maurice Dobb. 1932.


A compact and reliable book, in the same series as the present volume.

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United Service Institution of India
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- * Books drawn by a member can be retained for one month and renewed once, provided no other member requires them.
- * New books must be returned within two weeks.
- * Not more than two books may be on loan at the same time.
- * Members are prohibited from transferring books to other members.
- * Members will be required to pay full price with penalty of any book lost or damaged by them.
- * Reference and Rare books are not allowed to be taken out of the Library.
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